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Introduction:
The American Civil Liberties Union and the Conception of Civil Liberties

The 1988 Presidential Campaign
In 1984, Ronald Reagan won reelection to the presidency in a landslide victory
over Democratic candidate Walter Mondale. Four years later, he was vacating the White
House with his enormous popularity still intact. While Reagan suffered no shortage of
critics during his tenure in office, few would dispute that he had presided over a period in
which there had been a dramatic revival of a formerly slumping economy, a palpable
cooling of Cold War tensions, and a striking rejuvenation of the nation's self-confidence.
By 1988, Reagan's supporters lamented his retirement as the close of the "Reagan
Revolution"; he even was earning favorable comparisons with one of the greatest of
American presidents, Franklin D. Roosevelt.
The contest to determine Reagan's successor pitted Republican Vice-President
George Bush against Democratic Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis. Although
Dukakis held an early lead in the campaign polls, Bush had the election well in hand by
October. His November victory surprised few. Soundly defeating his opponent, George
Herbert Walker Bush captured the electoral vote of thirty-eight states and fifty-four
percent of the popular vote to become the fortieth President of the United States.

1

2
In the post-election analyses, political experts identified a score of factors that had
propelled Bush to the White House. Certainly the most popular interpretation credited
Bush's win to the legacy of the Reagan presidency and his association with that
administration. Yet such simplistic analyses did not reveal the entire story. Some
pundits posited that the election represented a repudiation of the Democratic candidate,
rather than a victory for the Republican. Governor Dukakis, these persons contended,
had wounded his campaign with feckless attempts to convince the electorate of his
leadership qualifications. First, Dukakis had touted his budgetary management skills,
which did not withstand the ensuing examination of his record as governor. Second, the
Democrat's foreign policy experience was non-existent. Last, Dukakis's personality
contrasted noticeably with the charismatic leadership to which Americans had grown
accustomed. Charitable descriptions referred to Dukakis as reserved and stoic; less
flattering portrayals described him as passionless and hopelessly wooden.
Other analysts credited the Bush campaign with defining Dukakis better than the
Democrat had defined himself. On the issue of crime, Dukakis had appeared "soft" with
the notorious story of Willie Horton's parole. The Republicans questioned Dukakis's
patriotism by highlighting the governor's veto of a bill mandating the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in public schools. And not to be forgotten was the attempt to
portray Dukakis as a far-left "liberal," a foe of the values that Middle America held dear:
seizing upon the Democrat's admission as a "card-carrying member of the American Civil

3
Liberties Union (ACLU)," Bush hammered his opponents time and time again, declaring
that Dukak:is's association with the organization demonstrated his un-Americanism.

The ACLU in the '88 Campaign
Overall, it remains impossible to gauge the effect of each separate issue on the
electorate's consideration of the candidates. Nevertheless, Bush officials undoubtedly
sensed that Dukakis's ACLU connection tilted the balance in their favor, which was the
reason for the issue's visibility in the late stages of the campaign.
Whether or not the Republicans were correct about the Union's "un-Americanism"
was not entirely clear. On the one hand, Bush's attack resulted in a dramatic increase in
the membership of the ACLU: the organization reportedly gained 10,000 new members
by December of 1988. Yet a reliable public opinion poll--ajoint The New York Times/
Columbia Broadcasting System survey in October 1988--revealed that, among persons
who felt qualified to comment on the ACLU, only thirty-nine percent held a favorable
opinion, while the remaining sixty-one percent took an unfavorable view. 1 Bush's
campaigners, in addition, insisted that even moderates responded favorably to their

1

The poll's results were as follows: of 1,136 registered voters surveyed, seventyone percent were either undecided or did not feel qualified to comment, seventeen
percent disapproved, and eleven percent approved. E. J. Dionne, "ACLU Studies Its
Image and Finds It Intact," The New York Times, 14 May 1989, p. 23.

4
candidate's denunciation. 2
How Republican strategists developed and exploited the issue ofDukakis's ACLU
membership proved to be one of the interesting stories of the campaign. Dukakis first
trumpeted his membership during a May 1987 speech in Los Angeles; he later repeated it
while stumping for his party's nomination in Spencer, Iowa. When focus groups-assembled by the Republicans to gauge public attitudes--responded negatively to the
mention of the Union, Bush campaigners "concluded that attacks on the organization
could be part of an arsenal" of issues to level against Dukakis. 3
Bush, however, did not embrace the strategy initially. According to newspaper
accounts, he balked, not desiring his campaign "to become a referendum on a 250,000member body that is also widely seen as an effective defender of civil rights."
Furthermore, Bush demurred because of conflicting personal feelings: although he
considered many of the ACLU's positions radically liberal, he also saw it as an effective
guardian of individual rights. 4

2

Maralee Schwartz and Paul Taylor, "More People Carrying ACLU Cards,"
The Washing.ton Post, 18 December 1988, p. A3; E. J. Dionne, "Latest Poll Finds
Dukakis Is Closing the Gap," The New York Times, 5 October 1988, p. Al and A14;
and Gerald Boyd, "Bush Takes New Tack on the A. C. L. U.," The New York Times,
30 September 1988, p. B6.
3

Joe Klein, "Ready for the Duke?" New Yorker, 17 August 1987, p. 30; Jeffrey
Leeds, "Impeccable Judgments or Tainted Policies?" The New York Times Magazine,
10 September 1989, p. 72; and Boyd, p. B6.
4

Ibid.
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Nevertheless, Bush grudgingly went ahead with his campaigners' advice.
Derisively referring to his opponent as a "card-carrying member of the ACLU," the
Republican's attack was an immediate success; reportedly, calls of support flooded Bush's
campaign headquarters. Thereafter, whatever his initial reservations, Bush did not
hesitate to invoke the ACLU in his electioneering. During a presidential debate in
Winston Salem, North Carolina, Bush linked his opponent to the organization's stands on
movie ratings, the Pledge of Allegiance in public schools, drug legalization, and the
distribution of pomography--thereby intimating that Dukakis opposed the film rating
system and Pledge of Allegiance and supported drug legalization and pornographic
distribution. In St. Louis, Missouri, Bush characterized the ACLU's agenda as "way out
in deep left field." Early in September, he declared,"! am not a card-carrying member of
the A. C. L. U. I am for the people." Then, in October, Bush accused the Union of
"always coming down on the side of the criminal and never on the side of the victim." 5

Public Reaction
Supporters of the Union complained that Bush unfairly portrayed the group as a
zealous, left-wing organization, when in fact the group took great pride in its
nonpartisanship. They also accused the Vice-President of taking the ACLU's positions
out of context, without emphasizing its organizational commitment to the defense of the

5

Klein, p. 30; Leeds, p. 72; and Boyd, p. B6.
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Bill of Rights. The New York Times denounced the McCarthyite overtones of Bush's
"card-carrying" rhetoric as a "shameless smear," for impugning Dukakis's patriotism.
Moreover, several columnists delighted in revelations that Richard Thornburgh, the
Attorney General under Ronald Reagan and likely candidate for the same position under
Bush, had served on the Board of Directors for the Pittsburgh chapter of the ACLU from
1966 to 1969.6
Critics of the Union, however, applauded the Republican attack. Daniel J. Popeo,
counsel to the conservative Washington Legal Foundation, stridently denounced the
organization: "The A. C. L. U.'s clients are dope dealers, terrorists, serial killers, rapists,
American Nazis, pornographers, and illegal aliens. Whenever they win, we all lose."
Heritage Foundation scholar William Donohue echoed Bush's campaign rhetoric: "The
ACLU has, at least in the last 20 years, become an extremist organization ... [it] is the
legal arm of the liberal left." Similar sentiments were voiced by New York lawyer Mark
Campisano, a former Supreme Court clerk for Justice William Brennan: "[The Union's]
agenda is fundamentally hostile to the processes of American constitutional democracy,
and should be rejected by thoughtful democrats of all parties. "7

6

"Card-Carrying Smears," p. 22; Anthony Lewis, "Season of Liberty," The New
York Times, 9 October 1988, Section IV, p. 23; and Richard Cohen, "Another 'CardCarrying Member of the ACLU'," The Washing.ton Post, 22 September 1988, p. A25.
7

Philip Sherron, "A. C. L. U. Reports Rise in Membership Calls in Wake of
Bush's Attacks," The New York Times, 27 September 1988, p. B6; Marcus, p. A8; and
Mark Campisano, "Card Games," The New Republic 199 (31October1988): 10.
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Origins ofa Hotly-Contested Issue: Constitutional Interpretation

Regardless of one's political orientation, the debate over the ACLU in 1988
illuminated the controversy that surrounds, and has surrounded, the organization since its
inception. How could Dukakis's seemingly innocuous comment about his membership be
transformed into a major issue in a presidential campaign? The answer ultimately lies in
the history of the ACLU, its goals, and its interpretation and protection of the rights
enumerated in the Constitution of the United States.
The Union inevitably has encountered much resistance and generated intense
controversy throughout its history. At least some measure of this antipathy stems from
the ACLU's organizational creed. From its some of its earliest publications, the group
defined its objectives thusly: "Our fight is to help secure unrestricted liberty of speech,
press and assemblage, as the only sure guarantees of orderly progress." Years later,
Associate Director Alan Reitman described the group as a "private, non-partisan
organization devoted solely to the protection of the Bill ofRights." 8
But while these aims appear straightforward, the Bill of Rights and the
implications of the freedoms granted therein spark heated debates even today. One

8The

first quotation may be found on the front page of Seeing Red: Civil
Liberty and the Law in the Period Following the War (New York: ACLU, August
1920), reel 90, American Civil Liberties Union, Records and Publications, 1917-1975
[cited hereinafter as ACLU Records] (Glen Rock, NJ: Microfilming Corporation of
America, 1977). The second quotation is located in American Civil Liberties Union.
Records and Publications. 1917-1975: A Guide to the Microfilm Edition (Glen Rock,
NJ: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1977), 1.
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source of controversy surrounding the Bill of Rights regards the issue of constitutional
interpretation. Some argue that the framers of the Bill of Rights intended for the
protection of certain, particular activities and this "original intent" of the document
should be observed in its strictest and most literal sense. The history of constitutional
law, however, intimates that the Bill of Rights retains an inherent flexibility. As
evidence, the United States Supreme Court, the ultimate arbiter in constitutional matters,
has reversed itself on several occasions as to the document's meaning. The most famous
example, the overturn of the 1896 Plessy v. Ferguson.decision with the 1954 Brown v.
Board ofEducation represents a potent reminder of the ongoing reinterpretation of civil
liberties.
Despite the Supreme Court's inconsistent definition of constitutional law,
however, critics accuse the Union of lacking an established core of judicial values. As
opponents rightly assert, the ACLU forcefully has argued--employing the "literalist"
position--for a strict separation between church and state. On the other hand, the Union
has employed the "flexible" interpretation--that the Bill of Rights grants certain freedoms
that were not mentioned specifically--contending that women's reproductive rights are
implied by the Constitution, when those rights are nor expressly protected by the
document's language.

9
The ACLU's Influential Legacy and Its Contemporary Implications
To be sure, the critics are correct: the Union's philosophical interpretation has not
been consistent. Nevertheless, the ACLU has proved itself remarkably successful in
persuading the courts with its arguments, which has been a source of irri~ation and
dismay to the organization's many opponents. Since 1920, the Union has exerted a
significant influence on some of the principal legal debates of this century. Even Mark
Campisano, one of the aforementioned critics, lists six major cases in which the Union
"improved the operation of our constitutional democracy": ( 1) the 1925 Scopes "monkey
trial," which defended the teaching of evolution in public schools; (2) the 1933 Ulysses
case, the challenge against censorship predicated on obscenity charges; (3) 1939 Hague v.
CIO, which protected the rights of organized labor; (4) the 1944 Korematsu case, the
fight against the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II; (5) the 1943
Barnette case, in which a state law forcing Jehovah's Witness children to salute the flag
was struck down; and (6) 1954 Brown v. Board ofEducation, which ruled educational
segregation ("separate but equal") unconstitutional. 9
Unmentioned, but equally significant, was the ACLU's involvement in the defense
of Sacco and Vanzetti; numerous cases opposing the death penalty; the Scotsboro case;
the fight for legal counsel for indigent criminals; the federal government's case against
Oliver North; countless civil rights trials; the protection of radicals during the two "Red

9

Campisano: 10.
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Scares"; innumerable cases delineating the separation of church and state; the
impeachment of Richard Nixon; and the battle for women's reproductive rights. Certainly
the Union has not won all of its cases, nor can it claim sole credit for the extension and
broadening of civil liberties during this century. But whether one loves or hates the
ACLU, it has been effective in convincing the courts.
Naturally, supporters of the Union maintain that the organization's victories have
had a positive influence on the defense of civil liberties. Former Chief Justice Warren
Burger ruminated that "... [i]t would be difficult to appreciate how far our freedoms
might have eroded had it not been for the Union's valiant representation." Yet foes of the
ACLU frequently counter that the group has offered its services to all sorts, from radicals
of all political shades to unrepentant criminals, some of whom represent a threat to the
law-abiding citizens of our society. One of the most recent expressions of this attitude
came from Ronald Reagan's former attorney general, Edwin Meese, who slammed the
Union as a "criminal's lobby." 10

Equal Representation and Public Perception
That the ACLU defends the some of the most marginal elements of society cannot
be disputed. Irrespective of its defendants' repugnance or unpopularity--whether they are
10Annual

Report, 1977, front cover, reel 3, American Civil Liberties Union,
Records and Publications Update, 1976-1980 (Sanford, NC: Microfilming Corporation
of America, 1981); and "Offensive/Defensive," The New York Times, 19 May 1981, p.
14.
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Fascists, Communists, white supremacists, and the most contemptible criminals--the
Union has granted legal aid to those whom it has deemed have had their constitutional
rights violated. The ACLU cites voluminous legal justification for doing so, an excellent
example of which comes from an obiter dictum in a 1864 Supreme Court decision:

The Constitution of the United States is a law for the rulers and the people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all
classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine
- involving more pernicious consequences was ever invented by the wit of
man that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great
exigencies of government. 11

Nevertheless, Americans often have had difficulty in accepting the notion that the
Constitution extends civil liberties to all citizens, without exception. A plethora of
examples would buttress this claim, but a recent one illustrates the point. In 1990 the
Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression surveyed 1500 adults on
the meaning of free speech. The results of the inquiry found "alarming evidence ... that
the First Amendment protects what the speaker has to say, but not so clearly the views of
others." In short, a double standard exists: while Americans feel that one should be free
to express himself freely, those whom he regards unfavorably necessarily should not be
afforded the same right. 12

11

As quoted in Charles Lamm Markmann, The Noblest Cry; a History of the
American Civil Liberties Union (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 48.
12

"Survey: Americans Believe in Free Speech, but Not for Everyone," Durham
CNC) Morning Herald, 15 September 1990, p. SA.
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To discriminate in the application of the Constitution's precepts stands as a
fundamental violation of the document's spirit--that all citizens are to be treated and
judged equally by the law. Thus when the Union is accused of criminal advocacy, the
organization responds with the aphorism: "The preservation of the Bill of Rights rests
upon the application of its principles to all without discrimination." Or, in is more
colorful moments, the ACLU restates this position: "Unless we defend the rights of the
sonsofbitches, we'll lose our own." The Union, in other words, maintains that the degree
of vigilance with which the civil liberties of all marginal groups are protected sets the
standard for the rest. This unbiased defense of any and all comers, claims the ACLU, has
generated a fair share of the controversy that has dogged the organization. 13

Partisans of the Left? The Scholars Weigh In
Historians and legal experts have widely divergent opinions on whether or not the
Union actually has observed a neutral position in protecting civil liberties. Donald
Johnson, author of several analyses of the ACLU, posits that although the organization's
"leaders certainly had their own political views in private ... the organization has never
defended any doctrine other than its own credo of unlimited free speech, free press, and
free assembly." Historian Charles Lamm Markmann echoes Johnson: "[T]he Union's
Who's Un-American? An Answer to the "Patriots" (New York: ACLU,
September 1935), p. 2, reel 91, ACLU Records; and Gertrude Samuels, "The Fight for
Civil Liberties Never Says Won," The New York Times Magazine, 19 June 1966, p.
14.
13

13
only goal is equal justice and equal freedom for all ... [and] scrupulously avoids
embracing any political or partisan cause in its dedication to furthering the Constitutional
rights of all." In his examination of the organization's contributions to changing public
attitudes toward individual liberty, Samuel Walker maintains that the ACLU has not
concerned itself with its clients' political leanings or moral character; the group, he
contends, has observed an "absolutist" stance with regard to the civil liberties. Finally,
Barton Bean, in his doctoral dissertation on the Union, concludes that "it is non-partisan,
having neither political affiliation nor corporate sympathy with the beliefs of those whose
rights it upholds." 14
Yet William Donohue, author of several analyses on the ACLU, supports the
opposing viewpoint. He asserts that the history of the organization is replete with
examples of partisanship: "The evidence amassed here [his analysis] indicates that the
ACLU is no more free from partisanship than the Republican and Democratic parties."
Moreover, in the introduction of his second analysis on the Union, Twilight of Liberty,
Donohue further impugns the group's conduct: he suggests that the ACLU occasionally
offers its services to elements on the right because "it is good for public relations to

14

DonaldJohnson, The Challenge to American Freedoms: World War I and the
Rise of the American Civil Liberties Union (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky
Press, 1963), vi; Markmann, 426 and 428; Samuel Walker, In Defense of American
Liberties: A History of the ACLU (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 5; and
Barton Bean, "Pressure for Freedom: The American Civil Liberties Union" (Ph.D.
diss., Cornell University, 1955), i.
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appear nonpartisan, especially when the case in point is sure to gamer high visibility." 15
Throughout its history, the ACLU has maintained that critics, like Donohue, are
either ill-informed or willfully ignorant of the group's true purpose. The ACLU's
response is simple: since groups or persons on the left have been victimized more often
than those on the right, the organization has come to their aid. "Our clients are not
chosen by us but by those who attack their rights," declares the Union. 16 Buttressing its
contention, the Union reminds opponents of its aid to Iran-Contra figure Oliver North, its
battle to place ex-Ku Klux Klan member David Duke on the ballot, its attempts to secure
marching permits for the Klan and Nazis throughout the United States, and its protection
of tobacco industry advertisements. These instances of assistance to big business,
conservatives, and extreme elements on the right, insists the ACLU, demonstrates that it
has not confined its efforts to traditionally liberal causes. 17

15William

Donohue, The Politics of the American Civil Liberties Union (New
Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1985), 4; and William Donohue, Twilight of
Liberty: The Legacy of the ACLU (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1994), xi
and 303.
16Weekly

Press Bulletin #778 (20 August 1937), reel 7, ACLU Records. A
contemporary defense by the organization may be found in "An Exchange on the
ACLU," The New Republic (12 December 1988): 22-23.
17William

Donohue argues that the Union's recent decisions to aid conservative
causes are merely window dressing to veil its decidedly leftist agenda. See Donohue,
Twilight of Liberty, ix-xxi.
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The Extirpation a/Communism
Supporters and members of the Union maintain that the organization turns a blind
eye to its choice of clients; they assert that the group has no political agenda, and never
has. This analysis will examine the ACLU's claims to its unbiased defense of civil
liberties. For at least in one case, in 1940, the Union did not observe an impartial
position with regard to one of the most divisive political issues of the time; moreover, the
incident involved one of its own, a widely respected member and one of the
organization's founders.
In May 1940, the ACLU's Board of Directors held a hearing on Elizabeth Gurley
Flynn's continued service on the Board. This study, in analyzing the Flynn affair and the
factors that precipitated the hearing, will examine the ACLU's putative neutrality in the
defense of civil liberties. Throughout the analysis, the reader should keep a single
question in mind: in its consideration of Flynn's adherence to civil liberties was the Union
betraying its most cherished principle--the unbiased protection of the Constitutional
rights of all Americans and all groups, however unpopular they may be--or was the
organization trying to ensure that this principle was maintained?

Chapter One
The American Civil Liberties Union and Connections with Radicalism

Martin Dies and the Special Committee to Investigate Un-American Activities

In June 1937, Representative Martin Dies, a Democrat from Texas, introduced
House Resolution 282 to investigate subversion within the United States. The resolution
called for the creation of a special committee, consisting of seven members, to determine
"the extent, character, and object ofun-American propaganda activities in the United
States" and to recommend suggestions for counteracting such efforts. 1
Although a similar resolution had been defeated in March 1937 and several
representatives spoke passionately against Dies's proposal, the House Rules Committee
reported favorably on Resolution 282 in early May 1938.2 Debate before the full House
opened on 26 May and, by voice vote, the Resolution was adopted later in the day .3 The
only amendment adopted by the House ordered the newly-created committee to report its

1

Walter Goodman, The Committee: The Extrordinary Career of the House
Committee on Un-American Activities (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1964), 1323; and Congress, House of Representatives, 75th Congress, 1st sess. Congressional
Record (21June1937), 7352.
2

1t should be noted that Dies served on the exclusive Rules Committee.

3

Dies requested a call for the previous question, which ended debate on the
resolution, and this parliamentary procedure passed by a vote of 191to41. Although this
tally is in no way indicative of the margin by which the resolution may have passed, it
may give the reader a general idea of the level of support. Goodman, 23.
16

17
findings by the opening of the following Congress--3 January 1939.4
The Committee, by separate resolution, received an appropriation of $25,000 for
its investigation. William Bankhead, the Speaker of the House, appointed Dies to chair
the Special Committee on Un-American Activities; Dies was joined by Arthur Healey of
Massachusetts, John Dempsey of New Mexico, John Starnes of Alabama, Harold Mosier
of Ohio, Noah Mason of Illinois, and J. Parnell Thomas of New Jersey. 5 The House UnAmerican Activities Committee (HUAC), which had escaped the attention of much of the
news media, would not toil in obscurity for long.

Predecessors in the Investigation ofRadicalism

By no means was HUAC--or the Dies Committee, to which it was commonly
referred--the first entity to examine domestic radicalism. The investigation of "unAmericanism" harkened back to a period two decades earlier.
In the aftermath of World War I, the United States' underwent great turmoil in
reconverting its wartime economy to the "normalcy" of peace. The reassimilation of
returning soldiers into the workforce and the subsequent displacement of the blacks and
women who had filled their positions, along with the relaxation of the federal controls
4

Congress, House of Representatives, 75th Congress, 3rd Session, Congressional
Record (10 May 1938), 6562.
5

"Dies Red Hunt Bill Is Passed by the House," Daily Worker, 27 May 1938, p.
103, vol. 1088, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ
[cited hereinafter as ACLU Collection]; and Analysis of the HUAC's 1938 Hearings, 14
December 1939, p. 195-209, vol. 2077, ACLU Collection.
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over the economy, resulted in high inflation, a short yet severe depression, and a dramatic
slide in the stock market. Laborers, freed of patriotic appeals for increased wartime
production, led a spate of postwar strikes for better wages and fewer hours. Socially, a
surge of patriotic zeal and heightened fears of domestic subversion accompanied this
period of economic turmoil, causing Americans to vent pent-up resentments toward some
of its most vulnerable members.6
Among the groups most persecuted during this period included those who were
perceived to sympathize with or support bolshevism. The Bolsheviks' bloody takeover in
Russia, their anti-democratic principles, and their withdrawal from the war had generated
a great deal of antipathy domestically. Moreover, the Bolshevik sanction--real or
imagined--of atheism, the nationalization of property, the elimination of class
distinctions, and "free love" appeared a direct challenge to American values and
traditions. The militancy of organized labor in early 1919 first raised the specter of
bolshevism's appearance in the United States. International developments, like the
establishment of Marxist regimes in Bavaria (April 1919) and Hungary (March 1919) and
the formation of the Communist International (March 1919) exacerbated fears to hysteric

6

Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study in National Hysteria. 1919-1920
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), 3-17; Stanley Coben, "A Study in
Nativism: The American Red Scare of 1919-20," Political Science Quarterly 79 (March
1964): 53 and 59-75; and Theodore Draper, The Roots of American Communism (New
York: The Viking Press, 1957), 202-04.
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levels. 7
Before and during this first "Red Scare," the fledgling National Civil Liberties
Union--which renamed itself the American Civil Liberties Union in 1920--actively
defended the civil liberties of alleged Bolsheviks, as well as militant unionists and other
radicals. In doing so, the organization earned the enmity and opprobrium of those
seeking to curb radical activities. Withering attacks rained on the ACLU; frequently
opponents charged the organization with sympathy for or even membership in the very
groups the Union was attempting to defend. 8

Outgrowths of the Red Scare: the Overman Committee and Lusk Committee

In February 1919--the early stages of the Red Scare--the United States Senate,
bowing to public pressure for an investigation of seditiousactivities during the war,
expanded an ongoing probe by a Judiciary Committee subcommittee to include an
inquiry into bolshevism. The subcommittee's final report included testimony on the
National Civil Liberties Bureau, in which it was accused of actively engaging in the legal
protection of pacifists, conscientious objectors, and members of the International Workers
of the World. Seizing upon the report's findings, the organization's opponents claimed

7Peter

G. Filene, Americans andthe Soviet Experiment. 1917-1933 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 39-71; Murray, 33-238; and Draper, 65-79 and 97113.
8

Johnson, 26-118.
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that the testimony confirmed its Bolshevik sympathies. 9
Corroborating the testimony compiled by the Overman committee--as the Senate
subcommittee was often called--was the determination of a state legislative body. One
month after the establishment of the Overman committee, the New York legislature,
reacting to a highly publicized report on the pervasiveness of Bolshevik activity in New
York City, created a special joint committee to study the issue. Republican state senator
Clayton Lusk chaired the body, designated the Joint Legislative Committee of the State
of New York Investigating Seditious Activities. 10
In a little over a year the so-called "Lusk Committee" published a report,
succinctly entitled "Revolutionary Radicalism, its History, Purpose and Tactics, with an
exposition and discussion of the steps being taken and required to curb it." 11 In its
staggeringly voluminous findings, the Lusk Committee determined:

9August

Raymond Ogden, The Dies Committee: A Study of the Special House
Committee for the Investigation of Un-American Activities 1938-1944 (Washington, DC:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1945), 16-19; "Senate orders Reds Here
Investigated," The New York Times, 5 February 1919, p. 1; "Senators Tell What
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The American Civil Liberties Union, in the last analysis, is a
supporter of all subversive movements, and its propaganda is detrimental
to the interests of the State. It attempts not only to protect crime but to
encourage attacks upon our institutions in every form. Many of the
members of its Committee are undoubtedly sincere in their convictions,
but the consequences of their activity are injurious to the public interest. 12

R. M Whitney's Reds in America and the 1924 Senate Report
By the fall of 1920, the anti-Red hysteria had begun to subside. Nevertheless, the
underlying fears of radicalism persisted; as historian Robert Murray asserts, "a high
degree of Scare-inspired psychology ... [remained] down to 1924-25." Hence, the
publication of two anti-ACLU documents in 1924 owed their origins--albeit indirectly--to
the consequences of the anti-bolshevism following World War I and the concomitant
curtailment of civil liberties. 13
During the Red Scare, as the public's appeals for eradicating the Bolshevik
menace intensified, the two branches of the Communist Party went underground to
escape persecution. Isolated, plagued by factionalism, and functionally hamstrung, the
Party experienced a precipitous decline in membership in the ensuing years. 14
Nevertheless, the unified Communist Party of the United States of America
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(CPUSA)--such as it was--managed to survive. In late August 1921 the CPUSA planned
a secret convention near Bridgman, Michigan, in the woods surrounding Lake Michigan.
The Justice Department's Bureau of Investigation, ever-vigilant of Communist activity,
received an anonymous tip about the gathering and, on 22 August 1922, raided the
meeting. The operation yielded handsome returns: the Bureau arrested seventeen
members of the Party, and unearthed--literally--a wealth of secret Party documents. 15
Within six months of the arrests at Bridgman, the Boston Evening Transcript
printed a number of articles by R. M. Whitney, a former reporter and editor for several
I

big-city newspapers and the Associated Press. wliitney, who served as the director of the
super-patriotic American Defense Society, focused on the events at Bridgman and the
legal maneuverings of the arrested Communists before the trial's outset. As some of his
source material, Whitney used the seized Communist documentation, which was
graciously made available to him by William Burns, the head of the Bureau of
Investigation. 16
The Union, which was defending the Communists' right to assemble freely,
received Whitney's close scrutiny in his series. A year later, in February 1924, Whitney
combined the pieces into a wider examination of the CPUSA and its allies to form a
book, Reds in America. "Definitely link[ing]" the Union to "part of the open, legal
15
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machinery of the Communist party," the book referred to the organization as "a central
organization for the defense ofradicals and Communists." Whitney, moreover, tied the
activities of several ACLU members with radicalism, surveyed the organization's position
on various civil liberties issues, and listed several of its cases on behalf of Communists
and labor.17
Also in 1924, the Union suffered an assault from one of its strongest allies:
organized labor. The United Mine Workers, which had been experiencing increasing
pressure since the Red Scare to distance itself from communism and militant unionists,
took the hard-line against the vestiges of radicalism within and outside its ranks. 18
In August 1923, Ellis Searles, editor of the Mine Worker's official publication,
produced a series of articles examining Communist infiltration of the labor movement.
Searles's pieces, carried by major newspapers throughout the country, eventually were
combined into a single report for the United States Senate. In its analysis of the ACLU,
the thrust of the report maintained that the organization's coziness with the CPUSA
stemmed from the number of "parlor pinks" on the ACLU's governing bodies.
Additionally, the report claimed the ACLU "pos[ed] as the champion of free speech and
civil liberty, but serv[ed] as a forerunner and trail blazer for the active and insidious
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activities of the Communists among labor organizations." 19

The Fish Committee, 1930
After the publication of the United Mine Workers' report, the Union enjoyed a
six-year respite from organized congressional examination. Yet the lull ended in early
May 1930, when the House of Representatives initiated its own inquiry into domestic
radicalism. Galvanized by the New York City's police commissioner announcement
before the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization that he had obtained
documents connecting the Amtorg trading company with the distribution of Communist
propaganda,20 the House overwhelmingly passed Resolution 220 to establish the
Committee to Investigate Communist Activities. Hamilton Fish, a conservative
Republican from New York, was appointed chairman of the committee. 21
The ACLU construed Fish's selection as an ominous portent. Fish, a "scion of an
aristocratic family," was well-known for his anti-radical sentiments and his animus
towards the Union. He had founded the American Legion, an organization which--not
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coincidently--had targeted the Union continuously in its attacks on "extremists. "22 In fact,
only the National Civic Federation rivaled the Legion in membership and resources; but
the Legion stood second to none in its dissemination of anti-radical literature, which, of
course, featured the Union prominently. 23
Thus, when the Fish Committee, as it became known, inevitably invited the
ACLU to testify, the organization balked. Even when subpoenaed, the Union complied
only with great reluctance, fearing that it already had been prejudged. Nevertheless, the
ACLU sent its Director, Roger Baldwin, as its representative. On 5 December 1930,
Baldwin declared before the full Committee:

Concerning the work of the Civil Liberties Union, we state to you
that we have no connection whatever with Communist organizations
except to defend their rights of freedom of speech, press, and assemblage
on precisely the same basis as we defend the rights of others. That we
have more occasion to defend Communists than others is due solely to the
fact that they are the chief victims of attack. 24
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Baldwin's testimony apparently did not persuade its audience, however. To
underscore the organization's radical bent, the Fish Committee's 17 January 1931 report
included portions of his statement, in which he appeared to sanction assassination and the
overthrow the United States Government. As a result, the report found:

The American Civil Liberties Union is closely affiliated with the
Communist movement in the United States, and fully 90% of its efforts
are on behalf of the Communists who have come into conflict with the
_-_}aw. It claims to stand for free speech, free press, and free assembly; but it
is quite apparent that the main function of the American Civil Liberties
Union is to attempt to protect the Communists in their advocacy of force
and violence to overthrow the government, replacing the American flag by
a red flag, and erecting a Soviet government in place of the Republican
form of government guaranteed to each state by the Federal Constitution. 25

Metastasis ofMisinformation
The first Red Scare and the Union's defense of radicals of all stripes during this
period set the stage for the next two decades. The reader should be aware, however, that
the events recounted in this chapter provide only a brief overview of the ACLU's
confrontations with the Communist label. In fact, the Union also waged high-profile
battles with the Department ofWar,26 a host of patriotic organizations,27 the American
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Federation ofLabor,28 Congressmen Thomas Blanton from Texas and Thomas Sosnowski
from Michigan,29 the Hearst newspapers,30 columnist Harold Lord Vamey,31 Jersey City
mayor Frank Hague,32 and author Elizabeth Dilling. 33
Yet the five publications cited--the Overman Committee report, the Lusk Report,
the United Mine Workers' Senate report, Whitney's Reds in America, and the Fish
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Report--distinguished themselves from the aforementioned foes for several reasons: (1)
they established a pattern that would be repeated by ersatz predecessors; and (2) they
formed the foundation and served as the reference material for later anti-Union literature.
Moreover, all five, directly or indirectly, originated from the anti-radical hysteria
following World War I. The Overman Committee, appointed to investigate wartime
propaganda, directly linked the National Civil Liberties Bureau with the defense of
radicalism. Established for similar reasons, the Lusk Committee reinforced this
connection. The United Mine Workers designed its report to distance the labor union
from the militancy of the post-war period. The rise of patriotic organizations and their
influence led to the publication and dissemination of Whitney's Reds in America;
Hamilton Fish, founder of one the most powerful nationalist organizations after the war,
the American Legion, headed the 1930 congressional investigation.
Invariably, all five documents confused the organization's defense ofradicals with
its support for their philosophies. Yet the similarities between their conclusions and the
absence of an easily discernible animus against the ACLU, coupled with a shallow
understanding of the evidence behind the charges, tended to lend credence to their
findings. Furthermore, by appealing to their readers' basest prejudices and engaging in
the grossest exaggerations, the five utilized the most effective tools of demagoguery in
their most despicable form. HUAC, the most formidable foe confronted by the Union,
would experience little difficulty building on its forebears' mountain of "evidence."

Chapter Two
Struggles Against Well-Orchestrated Smears

The Dies Committee in Historical Perspective
Historical and legal analyses of HUAC have been severely critical of its
investigatory procedures. Walter Goodman, August Ogden, and Jerold Simmons--several
of the foremost scholars of the Dies Committee--emphasjze that, in the absence of normal
legal safeguards, a congressional inquiry must evaluate the evidence and sift fact from
fiction. All three agree that HUAC thoroughly ignored its responsibilities in this regard.
HUAC, they note, relied almost exclusively on the testimony of friendly witnesses for its
investigation; it, however, rarely sought any supporting material from its witnesses to
corroborate up their allegations, nor did it cross-examine testifiers.
Beyond its failure to sift fact from fiction, the Committee's scholars also condemn
its general failure to summon persons who might have offered contrary points of view
from previous witnesses or rebut prior testimony. Time after time, HUAC maintained
that it did not possess the time or the resources to compel witnesses to appear before it.
Yet, as the writers show, many of the unjustly accused actively sought an audience before
the Committee, only to be ignored or refused. Consequently, a number of individuals and
organizations who were unable to address potentially slanderous charges or confront their
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accusers suffered irreparable damage to their reputations.
Last, its critics denounce HUAC for promoting a unique form of accusation and
lending credibility to its practice--guilt by association. As its own transcripts show, the
Committee allowed witnesses to brand certain persons and entire organizations as
Communist merely by linking Communists with their activities. Frequently, the
connections amounted to little more than a commonality in purpose or interest: for
example, the presence of a single Communist on a membership list could indicate an
entire organization's "Red" sympathies. No matter how tenuous the association, however,
HUAC did not discourage the practice. And compounding the perniciousness of this
procedure, the media carried the charges verbatim, never having checked their veracity. 1

The ACLU and HUAC, 1938

Generally, observers--even those within Congress--assumed that HUAC would
devote most of its resources to the investigation of Nazis and nazism, which was
experiencing a marked growth in this country. It became apparent, however, that while
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HUAC would not ignore fascism completely, "un-American activities" would concentrate
on activities on the left of the political spectrum in far greater detail than those on the
right. Particularly in its early days, HUAC purposely misdefined "communism" to
encompass the broadest range of activities possible, allowing a host of professional
patriots and disaffected ex-Communists to inveigh against organized labor, an array of
New Deal programs, and a host of liberal and leftist organizations. 2
With its long history of purported Communist affiliation, the Union provided an
easy target for HUAC's inquiry. The first mention of the Union came from Walter Steele,
the managing editor of the conservative monthly, National Republic. Steele, on 16
August 1938, submitted to HUAC a list of 640 national groups--ofwhich the Union was
one--that he had determined were affiliated with the CPUSA. He testified that the total
membership of these groups totaled over 6.5 million persons and devoted $10 million
annually to subversive causes.3
On 17 August 1938, Homer Chaillaux reinforced Steele's testimony on the ACLU
from the previous day. Chaillaux, the head of the American Legion's Americanization
Committee, specifically directed HUAC's attention to the personal views of Roger
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Baldwin. Reading from Baldwin's 1935 Harvard class yearbook, Chaillaux stunned
HUAC with the following passage:

My chief aversion is the system of greed, private profit, privilege and
violence which makes up the control of the world today, and which has
brought it to the tragic crisis of unprecedented hunger and unemployment.
Communism is the goal.

Whereupon, Chaillaux subsequently disclosed Baldwin's connection to the Garland Fund
which, he claimed, financed radical activities throughout the United States. 4
Steele's and Chaillaux's testimony made an impact on the Committee. A week
and a half after their appearances, Martin Dies delivered a nation-wide radio broadcast to
discuss the findings ofHUAC's preliminary hearings. In the course of his address, Dies
declared that the ACLU formed an "integral" role for the "Communist front"
organizations in the country. 5
The Union, momentarily taken aback by the news coverage of Dies's broadcast,
defied the Chairman to produce a shred of support for his allegation. In a cable to Dies,
Arthur Garfield Hays, the Union's chief counsel, wrote:

Your charge that the Union is Communist-controlled and carrying
on the work of the Communist Party under the guise of democracy is
wholly without basis. We challenge you to produce any evidence to bear

4 "Dies
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you out. It is just such irresponsible statements as these which have led to
the ridicule of your committee, to which you object. I shall be glad to
appear before your committee at any time you set to acquaint you with the
real aims and activities of the Civil Liberties Union.

Hays's offer, however, evoked little reaction from HUAC, which gave only "perfunctory
acknowledgment" to the letter. 6
A month-long lull followed before Dies occasioned to mention the Union again.
On 8 October 1938, HUAC's Chairman proposed that Congress check the spread of
foreign espionage by banning the CPUSA and all Fascist parties. To further ensure the
nation's internal security, he also suggested that organizations linked to subversive
political parties, "such as ... the Civil Liberties Union," be required to submit semiannual reports detailing their revenues and expenditures. 7
The involvement of several prominent members of the Roosevelt administration
in the ACLU also earned the Committee's attention. On 22 November 1938, Alice Lee
Jemison, a member of a shadowy organization called the American Indian Federation,
testified before HUAC that Communists dominated the upper ranks of the Interior
Department's Bureau of Indian Affairs. As evidence, Jemison contended that nine
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separate officials in the Bureau belonged to the ACLU. 8 To which, Dies, in a rejoinder to
her statements, intimated that such high-level infiltration had been condoned by the
Interior Department's Secretary, Harold Ickes. Ickes, noted Dies, also belonged to that
"Communist-front" organization, the Union. 9
Four days after the Chairman's smear oflckes, HUAC heard a former
correspondent for the Socialist newspaper, The Call, deny that either the Union or
Baldwin harbored Communist sympathies. Dies, naturally, rehashed previous testimony
to refute the reporter's comments. 10
The final episode involving the ACLU occurred on 7 December. On this
occasion, a self-professed expert on the Union, retired Army Colonel Lantham Reed,
accused the organization of defending atheists, strikers, and aliens. Naturally, although
Reed did not say so specifically, he intimated that such activities constituted its

8Not coincidentally, during his 1934 confirmation hearings as the Indian Bureau's
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier had withstood tough questioning from a
Senate committee for his membership in the Union. Collier, who defended the Union
vigorously, was confirmed and still served as commissioner in 1938.
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Communist influence. 11
HUAC concluded its 1938 hearings on 16 December. With the fanfare and
headline-grabbing news surrounding the Committee's investigation, the Union logically
anticipated that Chairman Dies would seek a renewal of his committee in the upcoming
Congress. To persuade the Congress against such a measure, the ACLU wrote William
Bankhead, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and urged him to end the
Committee's "unsavory career." 12
Surprisingly, considering its refusal to answer previous correspondence, the Dies
Committee replied to a copy of this letter. Robert Stripling, the secretary ofHUAC,
apologized for ignoring the previous letters, but blamed insufficient funding for the
Committee's inability to summon the Union. To rectify this wrong, Stripling requested
that the ACLU submit an affidavit denying charges of Communist affiliation, which he
promised would be included in HUAC's final report. 13
Although Stripling's offer did not square with its original request to appear before
the Committee, the ACLU nevertheless decided to prepare affidavits denying all linkage
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with the CPUSA. Ultimately, it submitted two, one on its own behalf and the other a
personal deposition by Roger Baldwin. The Union's nine-page affidavit, in part, stated:

... The American Civil Liberties Union has never been a front or part of a
united front for the Communist Party .... The American Civil Liberties
Union has no direct or indirect connection with any political movement. ..
. The Board of Directors and the National Committee are opposed to any
form of government, whatever its economic basis, which seeks to impair
the Bill ofRights. 14

Continuing, the ACLU emphasized that only one Communist, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn,
sat on either the National Committee or the Board of Directors. Furthermore, the
organization stressed that the number of its cases involving Communists had dropped
sharply in the preceding years and that on several recent occasions the organization had
opposed the CPUSA. In closing, the affidavit quoted a federal judge's ruling in a case in
which the defendant, Mayor Frank Hague of Jersey City, had leveled charges of
communism at the ACLU. Judge William Clark of the District Court of New Jersey had
ruled: "There is no competent proof that the plaintiffs [the ACLU] ... incited or
advocated the overthrow of the government by force and violence." 15

Affidavits and the Final Report
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The Union mailed the affidavits on 4 January 1939. What the organization failed
to understand from Stripling's correspondence, however, was that HUAC, by resolution,
had to present its final report on the day of or before the convocation of the 76th
Congress--3 January 1939. Thus the final report did not carry any mention of the Union's
depositions.
Whether Stripling intentionally misled the organization into submitting the
affidavits late is not known; the evidence suggests that Stripling knew what he was doing.
His reply to the Union's 10 December letter to the Speaker was not dated until 22
December--right before the Christmas holidays. Stripling, with only a minimum of
effort, could have ascertained that the ACLU would not be able to return the required
documentation in time. First, the Board had to meet in order to decide whether or not it
would respond; then, it had to draft and approve the language of the affidavit; third, the
affidavit required notarization. In the best of circumstances, the Union would have had
difficulty reacting within the given time frame; that HUAC did not make mention of the
affidavits until several months later and then buried that mention in over three thousand
pages of transcripts shows the reluctance with which it intended to honor its promises.
Therefore, the ACLU, unaware that it had prepared the affidavits in vain, was
stunned by HUAC's report. The Committee found:

... Some witnesses listed this organization as communistic while other
witnesses denied its was communistic. . . . From the evidence before us,
we [the Committee] are not in a position to definitely state whether or not
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this organization can properly be classed as a Communist organization....
[W]e strongly urge that this organization be thoroughly investigated.

Immediately following this refusal to identify the ACLU in its opening paragraph,
however, the report presented five full pages of evidence that linked the organization and
its members to the CPUSA, radicalism, militant unionism, and rm-Americanism. In
short, HUAC's final report clearly intimated that the Union was Communist, while
purporting to not be in possession of all the facts. 16

Aftermath
The public proved highly receptive to HUAC's report on the pervasiveness of
communism and fascism. One notable exception proved to be The New York Times,
which editorialized:" ... [I]t [HUAC] has sometimes brought itself into deserved ridicule,
and in doing so has endangered the very cause to which it supposes itself to be devoted."
Overall, though, HUAC enjoyed overwhelming popular support. The release of an 11
December Gallup poll revealed that two out of every three voters expressed familiarity
with the Committee's investigation and, of those, seventy-five percent believed that the
Special Committee Investigating Un-American Activities, Investigation ofUnAmerican Activities and Propaganda, 82-88. The five pages for support revealed the
carelessness with which HUAC compiled its evidence. Excerpts from the 1924 Senate
report by the United Mine Workers deliberately omitted an entire paragraph from the
earlier report to distort the allegations oflinkage between the ACLU and the CPUSA. In
addition, selections from the 1931 Fish Committee report repeated verbatim the same
misquoted testimony by Roger Baldwin from 1930. Unfortunately for the Union, though,
few paid close enough attention to notice.
16
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hearings should continue. In addition, Martin Dies had profited enormously from his role
as Chairman: in a list of outstanding public figures by the Chicago Advertising Club, the
Texas Democrat ranked fifth, one place ahead of President Franklin Roosevelt. Even
Sam Rayburn, a powerful Texas Democrat and future Speaker of the House, admitted:
"Martin Dies could beat me right now in my own district." 17
Naturally, with this reservoir of goodwill and support, Dies lobbied assiduously
for HUAC's renewal. The ACLU, in turn, launched an all-out effort to thwart his designs.
Its bid met with little success. The organization's intensive lobbying blitz on Capitol Hill
fell flat. Nationwide radio addresses by Roger Baldwin and ACLU counsel Morris Ernst
failed to generate the anticipated public response. In the end, even reluctant congressmen
were afraid to vote against HUAC's extension. The reauthorization measure, which
received bipartisan support, passed by a landslide, 344 to 35. 18
Thoroughly dismayed by the outcome, the Union took some comfort that Dies's
original request of a two-year extension and $150,000 had been pared to a single year and
$100,000. In addition, the organization's disappointment was tempered somewhat by
signs that the Committee had improved. First, HUAC hired skilled investigators from the
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Justice Department to gather evidence. Second, Congressman Jerry Voorhis, a liberal
Democrat from California and frequent critic ofHUAC's investigative techniques,
replaced a member who had been defeated in the November elections. The hiring of a
new chief counsel, Rhea Whitley, also promised to lend some balance and
professionalism to its investigations. Last, HUAC's early hearings focused more on
Fascist activities than they had during the previous year.

Internal Problems
Signs of HUAC's reform, however, did not allow the ACLU to return to business
as usual. In fact, the respite ignited an internal controversy that had been festering for
nearly a decade.
Crucial to the understanding of this episode of the ACLU's history is the effect
that HUAC had upon the organization. To be sure, the Union had been attacked on three
previous occasions by investigative bodies--the Overman Committee, the Lusk
Committee, and the Fish Committee. Yet all three, for a variety of reasons, either had
undermined public confidence with wild, exaggerated charges, or not been able to
galvanize widespread public interest. In contrast, HUAC had captured and held the
attention of even its staunchest foes. 19
HUAC's widespread public support disconcerted many within the ACLU, who
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could not understand why Americans did not see through the Committee's machinations.
What the Union failed to realize was that HUAC's investigation and the press's reporting
of the hearings did not appear as unfair and biased in print as they actually were.
Additionally, even when news reports did carry criticisms ofHUAC, they almost always
balanced their accounts with praise for the Committee's dramatization of the Communist
and/or Fascist menace within the United States. Even The New York Times, never an
admirer ofHUAC, conceded that "the committee [HUAC] has undoubtedly performed a
useful and important service. 1120
But ifHUAC's popular support was unsettling, its congressional support
thoroughly unnerved the Union faithful. During the ACLU's campaign to kill the
Committee, congressmen whom the Union considered to be "friendly" to its cause
confessed that they would be risking their popularity by going on record against HUAC.
When its allies pleaded political expediency, the ACLU knew that it faced an uphill
battle.
Even within the Union, members unquestionably felt that, while HUAC purposely
had harried the organization with spurious allegations, the ACLU also suffered a serious
public image problem. One indication, in particular, worried members: in fiscal year
1938, the organization's total revenues dropped by eighteen percent. Not surprisingly,
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Union faithful attributed the decrease to HUAC's vendetta against the organization. 21
Consequently, to rehabilitate its battered image, the ACLU initiated a public
relations campaign to lay the matter of the organization's Communist sympathies to rest.
It came in the form of a seemingly innocuous resolution, which emphasized the Union's

opposition to all foreign totalitarian regimes, while, at the same time, reaffirmed the
organization's defense of citizens who supported those governments. On January 1939,
the Board of Directors passed this measure by a vote of eight to four. 22 Unbeknownst to
the Board, it was an action that had far greater implications than the participants ever
could have predicted.
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Chapter Three
Hamstrung by Factionalism

The Board ofDirectors
In 1929, the ACLU became incorporated in the state ofNew York. To comply
with state law, the Union modified its organizational structure slightly. First, it created a
Board of Directors as its highest governing body. Second, the National Committee was
relegated to a purely advisory role, although all decisions referred to it by the Board were
binding upon the higher body. 1
Incorporation imposed an organizational structure on the ACLU that heretofore
had been lacking. Previously, the National Committee, comprised of persons living
across the United States, had set policy by mail-in voting; over time, this arrangement
had proven extremely unwieldy and time-consuming. Thus, for efficiency's sake, the
creation of the Board centralized all policy-making among persons living in or around
New York City, where the Union was headquartered.
By early 1939, twenty-three persons sat on the Board. Its members represented a
diverse, yet prominent group of persons. Among the most important were Harry F. Ward,
the ACLU's Chairman and professor of Christian ethics at Union Theological Seminary;

1
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Osmond Fraenkel, a lawyer and specialist on matters pertaining to free speech; John
Haynes Holmes, a minister and founder of the Community Church in New York City;
Arthur Garfield Hays, a nationally recognized lawyer; Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, the sole
Communist and a well-known labor activist; Norman Thomas, a leader in the Socialist
Party and frequent presidential candidate; Corliss Lamont, a professor of philosophy at
Columbia University; Elmer Rice, a critically acclaimed playwright; and Mary Van
Kleeck, a respected social worker. 2

Gastonia
Members of the Board clashed in the very first year of its existence over a dispute
with the CPUSA. In early 1929 the Board resolved to assist the legal defense of five
Communists who had been charged with the murder of a local sheriff and two deputies
during a textile strike in Gastonia, North Carolina. It quickly became apparent, however,
that the Union's meager budget could not sustain the projected expenses of what was
anticipated to be a protracted trial. To help shoulder the enormous costs of the defense,
the controlling board of the Garland Fund--upon which a number of ACLU members sat-allocated $18,000 for the Communists' bonds. 3

2
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National attention focused on the Gastonia trial, and the ACLU did not fare well
in the defense. After a lengthy trial, all five were found guilty. The defendants appealed
the decision and eventually earned a hearing before the North Carolina Supreme Court.
Ther~,

they lost again, and, having exhausted all other avenues, confronted the likelihood

of spending the rest of their lives behind bars. 4
Yet the Communists, perhaps in anticipation of this outcome, were not present
when the final verdict was read. Speculation swirled about their whereabouts, until
reports confirmed that they had skipped the country and fled to the Soviet Union. Having
jumped bail, the Communists cost the Garland Fund a total of $28,000--$18,000 for the
five's bonds and an additional $10,000 because one of the five also was a defendant in an
unrelated case in Michigan. 5
ACLU Board members fumed at the Communists' flight; they were doubly so
after the CPUSA sanctioned the bail-jumping. Even though the lost funds did not affect
the ACLU's budget directly, $28,000 in losses to the Garland Fund, which often served as
a de facto bank account for the Union, was a difficult pill to swallow. Exacerbating
matters, the bond-jumping in this case was predicted to increase bonds in similar
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circumstances. 6
Therefore, in a divided vote, the Board suspended bail allocations for all
Communists until the CPUSA offered guarantees that the occurrence would not be
repeated. Some on the Board protested vigorously that this should not become official
policy, but their objections did not prevail.7

.Rioting in Madison Square Garden

Gastonia, however, proved a minor dispute among the Board when compared to a
violent clash in Madison Square Garden. On 16 February 1934, Communists and
Socialists convened in the Garden to demonstrate against the rise of Austrian fascism.
From the outset, the Communists, determined to make their presence felt despite the
Socialists' overwhelming numbers, began to chant and sing; in the process, they
succeeded in drowning out the first six Socialist speakers. Meanwhile, fistfights erupted
throughout the auditorium where Socialist-affiliated ushers had frisked the Communists
and confiscated their banners and noisemakers. The climactic event occurred when
Clarence Hathaway, the editor of the Daily Worker, a Communist daily newspaper, took
the stage to request that the Communists stop their disruption. The Socialists, however,
interpreted Hathaway's presence as an attempt to incite the Communists further. In their

6
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determination to prevent the Communists from "stealing the show," the Socialists
forcibly removed Hathaway from the stage, beat him, and ejected him from the Garden. 8
The ACLU's Board appointed a Commission of Inquiry to determine the cause of
the brawl and how to avoid such confrontations in the future. 9 In its analysis, the
Commission found that the riot stemmed from long-standing hostility between the
Socialist Party and the CPUSA. It condemned the Communists, laying the bulk of the
blame on them for disrupting the meeting: "Both from the standpoint of the rights of
those who organized the meeting, of public interest in orderly assemblages, and of the
effect on united action against Fascism, this official interference by the [Communist]
Party was a catastrophe." Yet the Commission did not exculpate the Socialists, who had
exacerbated underlying tensions by: (1) employing untrained and aggressive ushers to
maintain control of the meeting; (2) searching the Communists and confiscating their
banners, musical instruments, and copies of the Daily Worker; and (3) attacking
Hathaway. 10
While no one disputed the Commission's description of events surrounding the
incident, one Board member took issue with its apportionment of the blame. The
Commission's mild rebuke of the Socialists enraged member Norman Thomas. Thomas,
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who also served as a leader in the Socialist Party, claimed that the reprimand was
designed solely to mollify the Communist sympathizers within the organization.
Consequently, he drafted a minority dissent, of which he was the only signatory, to the
Commission's report. Moreover, from that day forth, Thomas embarked on a
"remorseless vendetta against alleged Communist infiltration," according to fellow Board
member Corliss Lamont. I I

Lamont, Thomas, and the Litmus Test
The single best source for recounting the Union's internal struggles with the issue
of communism is Corliss Lamont. But by no means may Lamont, who joined the Board
in 1932 and served until 1954, be regarded as a completely objective observer. After
leaving the ACLU, he wrote two books, The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn by the
American Civil Liberties Union and Freedom Is As Freedom Does, that harshly criticized
11
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the organization for sacrificing the cause of civil liberties to anti-Communist posturing.
Thus his analysis must be handled carefully.
That having been said, Lamont should not be dismissed as just another
disgruntled critic of the Union. For one, he argues forcefully and effectively. Lucille
Milner, longtime Secretary of the ACLU, described Lamont as one who "had a way of
bringing out embarrassing facts at the most opportune or inopportune moment, depending
.upon which side of the table you were seated on." 12 Two, Lamont provides unique
insight--one that has never been disputed by another member of the organization--to the
Board's struggle with the issue of communism.
Of no small importance to Lamont's analysis is the mutual dislike that he and
Thomas shared for each other. Their animosity would become increasingly apparent in
the years that followed the Madison Square Garden riot and peaked during the
tumultuous years of 1939-1940. Thomas considered Lamont to be one of the Board's
closet Communists. 13 In tum, Lamont, even though he listed Thomas as an outstanding
member of the Board, claimed that Thomas "constantly put partisan politics above civil
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liberties." 14
Worsening interpersonal relations among Board members were not limited to
Thomas and Lamont, however; and, more often than not, the precipitating factor boiled
down to his or her stand on communism. In the aftermath of the Madison Square Garden
riot came the first grumblings from several Board members that the Union should make a
public declaration condemning communism. Thomas spearheaded this drive in 1936 and
-received backing from Board member John Haynes Holmes, who requested the expulsion
of Communists from the organization. Other members, however, did not share Thomas's
and Holmes's sentiments and tabled their resolution. 15

Rights ofthe Rich and Powerful
The next Board controversy focused on a 1937 judgment by the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB). Yet the origins of the dispute actually had begun two years
earlier.
In 1935, the United Auto Workers of America, emboldened by the passage of the
National Labor Relations Act (the "Wagner" Act), aggressively targeted the Ford Motor
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views on communism back in 1934 when he wrote that Communists were "a group of
savages, who like their Nazi competitors, make war upon all members of the human race,
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Company for its next unionization drive. The underlying symbolism escaped few
persons: not only was Ford one of the world's largest manufacturers, but its owner, Henry
Ford, was an unabashed foe of organized labor.
Ford fought a vicious campaign against the United Auto Workers. To achieve his
objectives, he resorted to outright intimidation and violence: the company formed
vigilante groups and hired goons to harass, assault, and beat union officials and Ford
-employees; it discharged all employees who were suspected of joining the union; and it
distributed anti-union literature to all in its employ. 16
Such tactics played right into the Auto Workers' hands. In late 1937, the NLRB
sided with the union, ordering the company to cease its "coercion"--the intimidation,
physical violence, and dissemination of anti-union pamphlets. Thereafter, Ford Motor
Company reluctantly complied with the first two directives, but continued to circulate
anti-union material. 17
On this final issue, the Union entered the fray. No one on the Board disputed that
the Ford Company had harassed its employees, physically and psychologically, nor was
there doubt about Henry Ford's complicity. The point of contention centered on whether
or not the NLRB could prohibit Ford from publishing anti-union views. Some on the

16

The National Labor Relations Board and Freedom of the Press (New York:
ACLU, December 1937), reel 92, ACLU Records; and Policies Concerning Civil Rights
in Labor Relations (New York: ACLU, August 1938), ibid.
17

Ibid.

52
Board insisted that the distribution ofliterature represented another element in Ford's
pattern of coercion and interfered with the employees' right to self-organize. Yet others
felt that Ford, regardless of his views on unionism, reserved the right to speak and publish
freely--just like anyone else. After extensive and acrimonious debate, a majority of the
Board decided that the distribution of literature did not constitute "coercion" as defined
by the NLRB and petitioned the NLRB to amend its ruling. The NLRB refused, but
when Ford appealed the case to the Supreme Court, the Court reached similar
conclusions. 18
According to Corliss Lamont, the minority refused to concede their side of the
argument. Since its inception, the Union had defended the rights of labor; now, some
Board members had great difficulty in siding with an employer. The minority argued
passionately that labor's rights consistently had been abridged by employers, especially
by ones as rich and powerful as Henry Ford, and, in this case, Ford's opinions on
unionism necessarily would have a chilling effect on workers' ability to organize. The
majority countered that Henry Ford's wealth and power was not the issue; rather a blanket
injunction abridging a person's First Amendment rights was patently unconstitutional,
unless that speech was followed by actions. 19
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The Ford Case in Perspective
Lamont neglects two crucial aspects of the Ford case: (1) the severity of the
dispute among the Directors; and (2) how it related to the issue of communism. On the
first count, it appears that the Ford controversy polarized the Board. Roger Baldwin
referred to it as "the greatest controversy we have had ever of free speech in the
organization." Lucille Milner, the ACLU Secretary, remembered:

No other single issue I can recall ever before generated such heated
discussion in the Board. After all arguments were exhausted and the
members had sufficiently released their pent-up feelings in other ways
they took to hurling accusations at one another. 20

At the root of the controversy was a dispute over what direction the Union should
take in the New Deal era. Undoubtedly, the plight oflabor had improved dramatically
since the ACLU's founding. In addition, the passage of the Wagner Act, which granted
employees the right to bargain collectively with employers, had marked a watershed in
labor relations. Thus, by 1937, labor had gained some measure of public acceptance and
legal protection, however tenuous both were. The overriding question at the time was,
did the labor movement still require the unwavering defense of the ACLU, or did recent
legal safeguards level the field to the extent that labor could defend itself in some
situations?
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Obviously for some Board members, old habits and causes die hard. Several of
them had devoted their efforts tirelessly for labor's advancement; they wore the scars, had
suffered the jailings, and been victimized in labor's battles. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, in
particular, since the age of fifteen had been involved intimately with many of the most
violent strikes across the United States. 21 Hence, to members like Flynn, Mary Van
Kleeck, Nathan Greene, Robert Dunn, and Abraham Isserman, forsaking the cause of
.labor meant repudiating some of the very reasons that they had become staunch defenders
of civil liberties in the first place. It was unthinkable to them that Henry Ford should be
afforded protection when he had menaced his employees so thoroughly.
Other Board members, led by John Haynes Holmes, did not have such fierce ties
to labor. The Ford controversy confirmed their growing concerns that the pro-labor
faction (Ward, et al.) were becoming knee-jerk advocates and subordinating the cause of
civil liberties to their own personal agendas. In Holmes's assessment,

... we [the Union] are allowing ourselves to become mere advocates of
the rights oflabor to the denial of those who are against labor.... More
reluctantly than I dare confess, I find myself believing that our enemies
have good reason for charging us with being partisan in the labor struggle,
and using the civil liberties principle as a means of fighting labor's battles
and the cause ofradicalism generally. 22
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How the issue of communism coincided with the Ford case has never been
entirely clear. Lamont's description of the affair certainly suggests that certain persons
who defended Ford's right of free speech construed the pro-labor faction's recalcitrance as
an outgrowth of their Communist sympathies. If Lamont's inference indeed was accurate,
this may have been the most pernicious consequence of the controversy. For now, the
attacks did not originate only from outside of the organization; they came from within.

Fast Forward
Only with the background into the Board's disputes over Gastonia, the Madison
Square Garden riot, the Ford case, and then HUAC do the occurrences of early 1939
become more comprehensible. As noted at the end of the second chapter, on 23 January
1939 the Board had approved, by a vote of eight to four, a resolution condemning all
totalitarian regimes. 23 The Board declared:

The American Civil Liberties Union is opposed to all totalitarian
govemments--Fascist, Nazi, or Communist--as the antithesis of civil
liberties, but will support and defend the right of persons to express or
advocate peacefully these economic and political theories. 24

Passage of this resolution resulted from the efforts of Norman Thomas and
staunch anti-Communist Board member Morris Ernst, a successful New York attorney.
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Ostensibly, Thomas and Ernst had acted to put the ongoing questions about the Union's
Communist sympathies to rest. But both had more than just the organization's well-being
in mind when pushing for their anti-totalitarian resolution. They wanted the organization
to take a stand--a stronger stand than was adopted--that reflected their own personal
feelings about civil liberties. Specifically, they had desired a listing of the foreign
dictatorships that engaged in wholesale violations of civil liberties, particularly the Soviet
-Union. Nevertheless, recognizing that more detailed language would jeopardize the
resolution's passage, they relented. 25
After the resolution's approval, however, members of the Board began to rethink
their position. Opponents of the resolution argued, with increasing success, that the sole
purpose of the ACLU was to defend civil liberties in the United States; the observance-or lack thereof--of civil liberties in other countries should not be of any concern to the

American Civil Liberties Union. On 6 March 1939, the Board rescinded the 23 January
resolution by a vote of seventeen to six. 26
A month later, the Board reiterated its continued defense of domestic radicals and
disinterest in international affairs. Entitled Why We Defend Free Speech for Nazis.
Fascists. and Communists, the ACLU's stated unequivocally:
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The Union does not engage in political controversy.... It [the ACLU]
takes no position on any political or economic issue or system. . . . It
defends, without favoritism, the rights of all-comers, whatever their
political or economic views. . . . It is wholly unconcerned with
movements abroad or with foreign governments. 27

Nevertheless, relations among members had degenerated to the extent that even a
restatement of policy produced acrimony. Debate over the leaflet's wording evoked one
particularly telling, and bitter, exchange. Commenting on the inclusion of Communists
with Nazis and Fascists in the title, Mary Van Kleeck asserted that the title reflected
Norman Thomas's desire to redress "Socialist scores against Communism." Countering,
Elmer Rice counterattacked: "If a disruptive force exists [in the ACLU], it consists of
those members of a tiny bloc who are Communists first and civil libertarians second. "28

HUAC and the ACLU, 1939
While infighting over totalitarianism preoccupied the Board, HUAC subtly shifted
its attentions from Fascist activities back to the Communist "menace." HUAC--partly
because it wanted to appear as if it followed its own recommendations about investigating
the Union and partly to deflect the Union's persistent requests to appear before the
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Committee--arranged for Roger Baldwin to give a deposition to its counsel, Rhea
Whitley, and its research director, Dr. J.B. Matthews.
The transcript of Baldwin's testimony revealed HUAC's particular interest in the
sources and expenditure of ACLU funds, the influence of Communists in the
organization, and the Union's cooperation with and defense of Communists.
Interestingly, Whitley and Matthews never once suggested that the ACLU was a
-Communist-front organization; their focus dealt with Popular Front organizations with
which the Union occasionally associated. 29
Baldwin's report before the Board on the deposition diverted--at least temporarily-the Board's attention away from its own internal conflicts. Recounting details of the
interview, Baldwin related that HUAC had retained the services of J. B. Matthews in its
information-gathering. 30 This news promptly spurred the Board into action. The
employment of Matthews, the Board agreed, violated Dies's pledge to observe the
impartial compilation of evidence. Therefore, Chairman Ward and chief counsel Hays
wrote Dies, reminding HUAC of its promise. Like many of the Union's previous letters,

29

Transcript of Roger Baldwin's deposition before HUAC, 31March1939, p. 12542, vol. 2075, ACLU Collection.
30

Matthews was well-known to the Board as a former Communist who, upon
quitting the CPUSA, had become a professional consultant on Communist activities for
superpatriotic organizations. Because of his unique status as a former insider, Matthews
attracted an unusual amount of attention, even when he leveled the most outrageous of
charges. In one instance, Matthews had captured nationwide attention for linking famous
entertainers, most notably actress Shirley Temple, with radicalism. See Weekly Press
Bulletin #864 (15 April 1939), reel 7, ACLU Records.

59
however, the correspondence was ignored. Undeterred, the Board sent a second letter to
HUAC a month later, admonishing it for its "unfair methods of investigation." HUAC,
nevertheless, still refused to acknowledge the communication. Frustrated by these futile
efforts, the ACLU subsequently redirected its energies to other matters of civil liberties. 31
Then, without warning or justification, HUAC launched its most serious
broadside yet against the ACLU. On 20 August 1939, Chairman Dies announced that he
-had written the Department of Justice, requesting that criminal charges be brought against
the CPUSA and other organizations for their failure to register with the State Department
as agents of foreign governments. Associated Press reports, which carried full passages
from Dies's letter, read:

The evidence before our committee clearly shows that the Communist
party [sic] of the United States is an agent of the Communist Third
International, which has its headquarters in Moscow. The evidence also
indicates that certain "front" organizations of the Communist party, such
as ... the Civil Liberties Union ... , [is] likewise [an] agent of the
Communist party. 32
-

Outraged and demanding a retraction of this "false charge," Arthur Garfield Hays
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wired Dies on the day the story broke to insist that the Union be given an opportunity to
appear before HUAC and clear its name. Dies replied on the following day, denying that
he had spoken to the press about the ACLU. Although, technically, he did not lie, Dies
clearly was splitting hairs, since he had released the letter to reporters. The Union, in
response, decided it would not play Dies's game of comparing what he had said with what
he had written; instead, the organization issued a press statement suggesting that Dies had
made a full retraction, when in fact he had not. 33
The ACLU came under attack again a mere two weeks later, when Earl Browder,
the General Secretary of the CPUSA, reportedly characterized the Union as a
"transmission belt" for the Party. Detailed accounts ofBrowder's testimony, however,
showed that he actually had not said what had been attributed to him. During his
appearance before HUAC, Browder was asked for his definition of a "transmission belt."
Browder replied that it was an organization that had mass membership, connections with
the masses, and/or shared common aims with the CPUSA. Whereupon, Representative
Parnell Thomas, a Republican from New Jersey, read a list of organizations, in which the
Union was included, and questioned whether or not they satisfied Browder's criteria as
transmission belts. Although Browder emphasized that the aforementioned groups
necessarily did not have close ties or even Communist members within their ranks, he
33 Ibid.
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could answer only in the affirmative because, at the very least, all qualified as either an
organization with a mass membership or connections with the masses. 34

National Civil Liberties Conference

On the heels of the Browder's testimony, the ACLU, in late September 1939,
announced a two-day national conference to address what it perceived as an increasingly
threatening atmosphere to civil liberties. Entitled "Civil Liberties in the Present
Emergency" and sponsored primarily by the Union, the meeting would cover all major
areas of civil liberties--blacks' rights, censorship, labor rights, academic freedom,
religious freedom, current legislative proposals concerning civil liberties, and aliens'
rights. The Union enlisted a series of notable speakers for the conference, including
Attorney General Frank Murphy, Senator Robert Wagner, Senator Elbert Thomas, and
Neville Miller, the president of the National Association of Broadcasters. Sixteen
national organizations pledged to attend the meeting, which was scheduled for 13-14
October.35
Chairman Dies, upon hearing of the various attendees, promptly denounced the
conference on the grounds that three of the sixteen groups were "Communist fronts." In
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response, the Union did not dispute Dies's numbers, perhaps because it feared that such
efforts would be fruitless. Rather, Arthur Garfield Hays telegraphed Dies to explain that
barring any of the participating groups for their political beliefs would defeat the
conference's very purpose. To assuage Dies's concerns, Hays extended an invitation to
Dies or any member ofHUAC to the conference to observe the goings-on. Dies, not
surprisingly, did not accept; HUAC member Jerry Voorhis, however, did. 36

Intimations ofa Backroom Deal

During the civil liberties conference episode, Martin Dies touched off yet another
controversy among the Board. It began with Dies's release of what many regarded as an
unusual statement: Dies remarked that he would be interested to see if the conference
would adopt a resolution that condemned communism. The comment piqued Corliss
Lamont's interest in particular, since it would take on greater significance with the events
that followed.
A week after the conference's close, on 22 October 1939, ACLU counsel Morris
Ernst met with Martin Dies to discuss a legislative proposal requiring private
organizations that engaged in propaganda to disclose their membership and financial
information. Ernst, who sincerely believed that this measure would quell popular fears of
communism, hoped that he could persuade Dies or another member of Congress to
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introduce the proposal. What--if anything--else the two discussed remains unknown, but
on the following day Dies announced before a HUAC hearing:

This committee found last year, in its reports, there was not any evidence
that the American Civil Liberties Union was a Communist organization.
That being true, I do not see why we would be justified in going into it. I
mean, after all, they have been dismissed by unanimous report of the
committee as not a Communist organization. 37

Dies's exoneration caught the Union completely off guard, although it was the
vindication that the organization had been seeking for the past fourteen months. Jubilant,
the ACLU issued a collective sigh of relief--at least initially. There had been many dark
days for the organization in recent months. Topping the list was the July 1939 release of
The Public Opinion Quarterly, which had carried an analysis ofHUAC's influence on
popular opinion. The article revealed that the Union's disapproval ratings had soared
nearly twenty-one percentage points as a result ofHUAC's hearings from 1938. And
with all the negative exposure the ACLU had attracted during the months of August,
September, and October 1939, few expected that the organization's numbers had
improved any. 38
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Yet once the relief subsided, Dies's sudden absolution aroused suspicion. Rumors
abounded within the Union, particularly after the Daily Worker carried a story with
intimate details of a meeting between Ernst, Arthur Garfield Hays, Dies, and HUAC
member Jerry Voorhis. According to the piece, Dies, Ernst, and Hays had spoken on the
day after the white-wash of the organization and agreed that, in return for Dies's
exoneration, the Union would aid HUAC in its exposure of Communist activities. In
.addition, independent sources circulated stories similar to the article, which were
convincing enough to prompt five prominent members of the ACLU to write a letter to
the Board requesting a detailed account ofHays's and Ernst's version of the meeting. 39
By far the most distrustful person, however, was Corliss Lamont. In Freedom Is
as Freedom Does, Lamont reveals that his personal inquiry into the Hays-Ernst-DiesVoorhis meeting uncovered some troubling discrepancies. Hays and Ernst reported to the
Board that they had spoken only about securing an opportunity for the ACLU to testify
before HUAC. 40 Yet Dies, in a letter to Lamont, revealed an altogether different story:

The real purpose of the meeting was to explore the possibility of united
action on the part of liberals and conservatives to investigate and expose
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Communists in the United States. . . . At the meeting I suggested that if
we worked together, we could destroy the Communist apparatus and
influence within a few months, and that the liberals would share in the
credit. Unfortunately, the meeting was not productive of any fruits. 41

Despite Dies's account, Lamont fully believed that some sort of an agreement had
been made. Examine the evidence, he writes. First, Dies suggests that the Union might
issue a statement condemning communism during the civil liberties conference. Then,
.Ernst and Dies discuss a proposal to monitor private organizations, but the details of their
conversation remain unknown. Dies, on the day following this meeting, shockingly
clears the ACLU, even though HUAC had referred to the organization as Communist on
two separate occasions in the past two months. The coincidence, Lamont points out,
certainly gives one pause. One's suspicions only mount, he declares, when hearsay
evidence asserts that an informal agreement was reached, but the participants--all of
whom maintain that a deal was not made--cannot agree on what was discussed. 42

Machinations or Coincidence?

In many regards, Lamont presents a persuasive case. First, Dies's comment before
the civil liberties conference does appear oddly timed. Furthermore, the meeting between
Ernst and Dies does have sinister overtones, especially when one considers that Ernst
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eagerly wished to contribute to the investigation of communism. Third, although the
Daily Worker article does not name its sources, the details of the meeting are detailed
enough to suggest that they either are accurate or the product of a detailed imagination.
Fourth, nearly every person who has analyzed whether or not the ACLU made a deal with
HUAC allows that Ernst certainly was capable of engaging in such machinations; as
historian Jerold Simmons declares, "his preference for moving behind the scenes and
-- making deals was well known." Last, there can be no doubt that either Hays and Ernst or
Dies did not tell the truth about their talk. 43
Yet Lamont's scenario suffers from several glaring weaknesses. While there may
be doubts as to Ernst's character, no one, either within the Union or outside of it, has
impugned the integrity of Arthur Garfield Hays. 44 To suggest that he participated--which
he undoubtedly must have if it indeed occurred--was not consistent with his character.
Second, Lamont's willingness to accept Dies's version of the meeting with Hays and Ernst
begs the question: why would Lamont take the word of person who had a history of
mendacity and deception over two of his colleagues? Most importantly, if Dies did
exonerate the ACLU in return for a promise to purge the organization of Communists and
sympathizers, then he must have believed, or at least received assurances, that the antiCommunists had the means and resources to fulfill their part of the bargain. Yet the anti-
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Communists on the Board, while stronger as a result of international events, had not
accumulated enough power to be able to guarantee that they.could purge the "Reds."
When raking these factors in mind, it appears highly unlikely that a secret deal was made.
Lamont's theory remains extremely revealing nevertheless: it bares the level of mistrust
and suspicion that had festered; now, Lamont suspected even his own colleagues of
conspiring against him and others on the Board.

The Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact
While the battle with HUAC ended with Dies's white-washing on 23 October, the
Union's internal battle over the issue of communism continued to rage. The debate
renewed in intensity after the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact on 23
August 1939.
Publicly, although parallels had been drawn between the Nazi and Soviet regimes
for nearly a decade, the Pact still stunned observers worldwide. Particularly among those
who had sympathized with the Soviet "experiment" or championed the Popular Front's
opposition to fascism, many of these persons now proclaimed to have been betrayed and
misled. In fact, in the popular mind, the two totalitarian regimes became largely
indistinguishable from each other: both had rejected democracy and capitalism;
monopolized power in the hands of a single, brutal dictator; silenced all domestic
opposition; exercised complete control over public information; and ruthlessly terrorized
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their populations. American commentators, particularly the press, reinforced this
analogy; as columnist Eugene Lyons wrote, "It [the Pact] exposed Hitler's Brown
Bolshevism and Stalin's Red Fascism as aspects of the same totalitarian idea." 45
Furthermore, after the Pact, whatever distinctions that could have drawn between
Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia diminished rapidly. In September 1939 Germany and
the Soviet Union mutually invaded, and subsequently dismembered, Poland. Then, the
-Soviet Union evidenced its own Nazi-like rapacity by incorporating the Baltic Republics
and launching an unprovoked attack on Finland. Such developments prompted the Wall
Street Journal to editorialize: "The American people know that the principal difference
between Mr. Hitler and Mr. Stalin is the size of their respective mustaches. "46

The Pact's Ramifications
The treaty's effects on the Board of Directors, and the organization as a whole,
cannot be overstated. It, more than the conflict with HUAC and the accumulated ill-will
from Gastonia, Madison Square Garden, and the Ford case, transformed the entire debate
about communism.
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Like many of the commentators of that period, several ACLU members viewed
the Pact as the merging of the Nazi and Soviet regimes into a monolithic, totalitarian
entity. The realization so stunned Roger Baldwin that he remarked to his biographer:

I think it [the Pact] was the biggest shock of my life. I never was so
shaken up by anything as I was by that pact. . . . [It] made you feel that
suddenly the Communists were different people. They had abandoned us
and got into bed with Hitler.

Others echoed Baldwin's disenchantment. Reverend John Haynes Holmes declared:
"I am sick over this business as though I saw my father drunk and my daughter on the
street. And all the more, since I feel that I have deceived myself as well as been
deceived. "47
The Pact greatly weakened the influence of Board members who sympathized
with Popular Front causes. Corliss Lamont, Harry F. Ward, and Mary Van Kleeck
suffered a huge embarrassment when, in early August, they were among four hundred
intellectuals who signed an open letter entitled, "To All Active Supporters of Democracy
and Peace." Declaring that "Soviet and Fascist policies are diametrically opposed," the
letter listed ten of the most fundamental differences between the Nazi and Communist
47
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political systems and insisted that Soviet socialism was progressive, pacifistic, and
democratic. Unfortunately for the signatories, though, the letter appeared alongside the
announcement of the treaty in the September publication of The Nation. Consequently,
Lamont, Ward, and Van Kleeck seemed to be little more than arch-apologists for the
Soviet regime. 48
Meanwhile, the Board's anti-Communists experienced a palpable shift of opinion
.· jn their favor. As indicated earlier, some Union members publicly bemoaned their
previous support for the Soviet regime. Roger Baldwin, disgusted by the unwillingness
of Popular Front organizations to condemn the Nazi-Soviet treaty, resigned his national
committee post from one of the largest Popular Front organizations, the American League
for Peace and Democracy (ALPD). Perceptibly, he gravitated towards Thomas, Holmes,
Rice, Ernst, and Riis. 49

The Chairman, Harry F. Ward

Baldwin's revulsion with the Popular Front mirrored other liberals'. In fact, the
Popular Front collapsed quietly, as most groups suffered mass defections of disillusioned
members. The ALPD, for one, folded soon after its chairman, Harry F. Ward,
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withdrew.so
During the period between the Pact's announcement and his resignation from the
ALPD, Ward's dual chairmanship of the ALPD and the ACLU directed a great deal of
attention to the diminutive, wizened Methodist minister. Ward, a professor of Christian
ethics at Union Theological Seminary, stood second only to Baldwin in reputation in the
ACLU; he had served as its Chairman since 1920. Corliss Lamont, one of his many
.-admirers, remarked that Ward was a "sensitive teacher, an excellent presiding officer, and
one of America's greatest crusaders for freedom." Generous with his time and energies,
Ward had received an honorary doctorate oflaw for his significant public service. He
also was world-renown for his intellect; among his regular correspondents was Mohandas
Gandhi.st
Ward's political alignment is a matter of some dispute. He never considered
himself a Communist, although he definitely sympathized with the Soviet Union. Eugene
Link, Ward's biographer, described Ward as a "constant defender of the Soviet Union ...
though his mind was never tethered by dogmatic absolute." In contrast, historian Robert
Moats Miller wrote: "If ever it is justifiable to designate an individual a true 'fellow
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traveler' that individual is Dr. Ward." 52
Regardless of Ward's political inclinations, though, his dual chairmanship became
a concern only after a disastrous appearance before HUAC on behalf of ALPD, in which
he stridently had defended the Popular Front and Communist participation in the League.
In a sense, despite his devotion and unquestioned defense of civil liberties, Ward had
become a symbol among some influential ACLU members of what had gone wrong with
--the organization. In October 1939, Board members Margaret DeSilver, Roger Riis,
Norman Thomas, and John Haynes Holmes indicated to Roger Baldwin that Ward needed
to step down. At that time Baldwin declined to lend his support to this group, arguing
that such a measure was too drastic. Yet Baldwin's authorship of a press release on the
matter intimated that the "purge" group's arguments may have struck a chord within the
ACLU Director. The statement, at best, gave a tepid endorsement to Ward's continued
leadership, declaring that the Board saw "no reason for taking any action at this time. "53

The "Wise" Report
Although HUAC had enjoyed nearly unbroken success in capturing headlines, the
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Nonaggression Pact thrust the Dies Committee back into the limelight. As the treaty
signalled the coming war in Europe, it also underscored the need for vigilance of Nazi
and Communist activities within the United States. Capitalizing on the heightened public
interest in its investigation, HUAC conducted a string of highly-publicized hearings, for
which it received very favorable comments. The New York Times commented:

Undoubtedly the Dies committee has thrown considerable light on the
activities, extent and objectives of the Communist and Nazi forces in the
United States, and brought out, according to many observers here, that
both groups are inspired by the Soviet and Nazi regimes respectively." 54

Despite the developments internationally and public's support for HUAC, though,
did not mitigate its violations of civil liberties in the ACLU's eyes. Once again, HUAC
was due for reauthorization in the House of Representatives in early 1940. This time the
Union vowed to be better prepared for the fight. Instead of repeating its previous
mistakes, the organization decided to build its campaign around a single position paper
outlining HUAC's·repeated unconstitutional practices.
Normally, the responsibility of forming the committee to draft this paper should
have fallen on Harry Ward. Ward, however, missed the Board meeting at which the
committee members were to be appointed; in his stead, the acting chair, John Haynes
Holmes, did the choosing. Holmes selected Raymond Wise, who headed the effort, and
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staunch anti-Communists Ernst, Riis, and Florina Lasker. 55
A month after appointment, the Wise committee presented the initial draft of its
report. It opened by praising the function of congressional investigations, asserting that
they had proved useful in educating the public in the past. Yet the report maintained that
HUAC had abused its prerogatives by admitting hearsay as evidence, failing to crossexamine witnesses, preventing the accused an opportunity to rebut, and promoting guilt
-by association. In its conclusions, the committee recommended that the House should
reject HUAC's reauthorization; however, it also allowed that HUAC had "performed a
useful and important service" and had compiled "a valuable and lengthy documentary
record of much activity and the spreading of considerable propaganda which are the
proper subjects of investigation and exposure. "56
The report's favorable assessments ofHUAC appalled several ACLU members.
To these persons, HUAC's wholesale violations of civil liberties could not be diminished
by its "worthy" intentions. Board member and noted expert on the First Amendment,
Osmond Fraenkel, deemed the report "an unworthy attempt to curry favor with Mr. Dies."
Abraham Isserman protested, calling it "superficial, inaccurate, and misleading."
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National Committee member Gardner Jackson mused:

... I cannot understand how logic ... will permit you to praise any part of
the findings of a committee whose operations you condemn in such large
degree. . . . [It is] like approving a judge who has been proven corrupt or
incompetent in a case or two but who, his friends claim, has been straight
and competent in others. "57

Nevertheless, the Wise report was not without its supporters. Raymond Wise, not
-"surprisingly, urged that the tone be "carefully preserved." Additionally, Norman Thomas
lent it his "hearty endorsement." John Haynes Holmes defended the Wise committee's
efforts unequivocally: "This report ... was an able document, which we might well have
been proud to present to the public. "58
Objections to the report were so vociferous, however, that the entire Board voted
to postpone the report's final draft in order to provide time to consider its critics' views.
To temper the remarks about HUAC, three additional members were added to the
committee--Osmond Fraenkel, Abraham Isserman, and Arthur Garfield Hays.
Nevertheless, the delay failed to spawn an acceptable revision for the critics, and the end
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result found little upon which anyone to agree. Although the enlarged committee
expunged nearly all of the favorable references to HUAC, the anti-HUAC minority still
refused to accept these concessions. Furthermore, those who had favored the original
draft resented the accommodations made for the minority. Regardless, after contentious
and exhaustive debate, the Board accepted the revised report on 8 January 1940. 59
Ultimately, the Wise report proved a fiasco, accomplishing none of its intended
-purposes. With seventy-five percent of Americans in favor ofHUAC, the report stood
little chance of derailing the Dies Committee's reauthorization; the reappointment
measure sailed through the House with overwhelming support. What was more, the
report--instead of uniting the Union against its common foe--shook the organization to its
very core. 60

Attacks on the Chairman
Wounds incurred during this latest dispute were given no opportunity to heal.
John Haynes Holmes, exasperated with the cohesiveness of the "fellow-travelers,"
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complained that he was "in a state of complete disgust" over the modifications of the
Wise report. He blamed the dispute on the influence of one person: "Today we seem to
be under the strange control of a minority, headed by the Chairman, which is primarily
concerned not with civil liberties at all, but with the interests of [the CPUSA] .... "61
By no means was Holmes the first to accuse Chairman Ward of plotting a
Communist course for the ACLU. After the flap over Ward's dual chairmanship, Board
member Margaret DeSilver, the wife of former Union director Albert DeSilver, submitted
her resignation, citing a loss of "confidence ... in the leadership of the Board." Although
Roger Baldwin pleaded for DeSilver to reconsider, she did not budge. Norman Thomas
also was as adamant as Holmes about Ward's removal. In October 1939 he had
threatened that "if ... Dr. Ward does not want to offer his resignation, ... [I and others]
are under obligation to press for action." Two months later, he targeted Ward again. In
the 16 December edition of the Socialist Party's newspaper, The Call, Thomas included
Ward among the "six to seven" Communists and fellow travelers who currently sat on the
Board. 62 Moreover, Thomas referred to Ward as one who "would drop [his] support of
civil liberty the instant Communists were in ... [a] position to deny ... [civil liberty] in
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the name of some cause dear to them. "63
While Holmes may not have been alone in his sentiments, he certainly was one of
the most vociferous of the Chairman's critics. On 4 December 1939 Holmes delivered a
stinging indictment of Ward's leadership, maintaining that Ward had "sacrificed this
cause [civil liberties] to other and alien interests." To remedy the problem, Holmes
recommended that Ward voluntarily resign his post, but intimated that official action was
_.unnecessary:

It would be easy to recommend a purging of our Board, beginning
with the Chairman. But I am not interested in purges; I am too conscious
of my own failures and deficiencies, to urge any attack upon my
associates. What I would urge is that we come to terms with ourselves,
and recognize what we are doing. It is an inner purge of our prejudices
and partialities, our hatreds and hostilities that we need ....64

Despite Holmes's comments, it quickly became apparent that once Ward refused
to leave voluntarily, an "inner purge" necessitated the actual removal of problematic
members. Holmes, however, did not spearhead this "purge" drive. Roger Baldwin, the
most esteemed of civil libertarians, led the way.
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Chapter Four
The 5 February Resolution

The Qualifications Test

In January 1939 the Board passed--then rejected--a resolution condemning all
totalitarian movements. Eleven months later, the anti-Communists, buoyed by the impact
bf the Nazi-Soviet Pact and the weakening of the Board's leftists, tested their strength
again. In a letter to Board member Richard Childs, Baldwin--a new and powerful
addition to the anti-Communist ranks--offered his solution to the Board's festering
dilemma. He proposed "a resolution to the effect that it is inappropriate for any person to
serve on the Board ... who holds membership in any organization engaged in curtailing
anybody's civil rights." 1
Conceptually, Baldwin's reasoning for the resolution was simple: a Board
candidate failed the .test of consistency if he supported totalitarian theories or forms of
government abroad while purporting to defend the Bill of Rights within the United States.
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The time had arrived, wrote Baldwin, for the Union to adopt a membership test
specifying that, while the defense of the Bill of Rights may be contained to the United
States, the ideals were applicable worldwide. 2
Baldwin's position overjoyed the anti-Communists. Although as an appointee he
did not wield a vote among the Board of Directors, his influence within the organization
and among the Board exceeded all others'. Undeniably, Baldwin's change of heart
·signalled that the momentum had shifted in favor of the anti-Communists. As was
evident by a noticeable change in their rhetoric, the anti-Communists became
increasingly confident. "I say without any reservation whatever," declared Elmer
Rice,"that any person who condones the dark and bloody crimes of the Stalin government
and who fails to condemn the outrageous invasion of Finland is disqualified, per se, to sit
on the board [sic] of the A.C.L.U.... [M]y conversations with various members ...
convince me that many, if not most, of them feel as I do. "3

Machinations
Regardless of the anti-Communists' perceived strength and their opposition to
Ward, however, they did not constitute an outright majority. Only five could be counted
safely among this group: Holmes, Rice, Riis, Thomas, and Dorothy Bromley; others, like
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John Finerty and Raymond Wise, were sympathetic. Thus, the anti-Communists,
undoubtedly aware of their uncertain strength, orchestrated one of the most unprincipled
maneuvers in ACLU history. On 15 January 1940 National Committee members across
the country received the following resolution, upon which their vote was requested:

The National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union
regards it as inappropriate for any person to serve on the governing
committees of the Union, of its affiliated bodies or on its staff, who is a
member of any organization which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any
country, or who by his public declarations and connections indicates his
support of such a principle. Within this category we include organizations
in the United States supporting the totalitarian governments of the Soviet
Union and of the Fascist and Nazi countries, such as the Communist Party,
the German-American Bund and others; and native organizations with
obvious antidemocratic objectives or practices, such as the Ku Klux Klan,
the Silver Shirts, Christian Front and others.
While the American Civil Liberties Union does not make any test
of opinion on political or economic questions a condition of membership,
and makes no distinction in defending the right to hold and utter any
opinions, the personnel of its governing bodies and staff is properly
subject to the test of consistency in the defense of civil liberties in all
aspects and all places. 4

According to the ACLU's by-laws, the Board of Directors reserved jurisdiction
over all matters pertaining to policy initiatives: only if a measure was approved by the
Board, did the National Committee vote and then, if approved, was it incorporated into
the organization's bylaws. Yet the aforementioned resolution had never come before the
Board for consideration; in fact, few even knew of its existence.
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The Board did not remain in the dark for long, though. When it eventually
learned that it had been circumvented, it acted decisively. On a motion by Abraham
Isserman, Chairman Ward ruled that the Nominating Committee, 5 which had approved
the resolution and mailed it to the National Committee, had acted without authorization
and that the results, whatever they may be, were not binding on the Board. The Board,
with the exception of John Haynes Holmes, upheld Ward's determination. 6

The Showdown
How exactly the qualifications resolution bypassed the normal process for
consideration remains unknown. Nevertheless, several facts were irrefutable: (1) Roger
Baldwin and Morris Ernst admitted that they had drafted the resolution; and (2) a
majority of the Board, including Ward, were unaware of the goings-on until Richard
Childs, head of the Nominating Committee, informed the Board of his committee's
action. In addition, it appears almost certain that Holmes, the Union's Vice-Chairman,
had known of Baldwin's and Ernst's activities.7
It immediately became apparent that this latest imbroglio would not pass without

a major fight. Harry Ward, a week after the 18 January Board meeting, announced to the
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press that, although he had planned to take a nine-month sabbatical from the Union for
health reasons, he now would not step down as Chairman. The anti-Communists quickly
grasped the significance of his announcement: Ward, who had indicated in early 1939
that he would relinquish his post after his term expired in February 1940, was signalling
his intention to stay on and defeat any resolution affixing qualifications for candidates.
As a result, the anti-Communists publicly declared their plan to oust him. 8

The 5 February Resolution

The boldness with which the anti-Communists announced their intention to purge
Ward was not mere bluster. At the 28 January Board meeting, they had evidenced their
strength with their first significant victory. By a vote of seven to six, the Board defeated
a motion by Mary Van Kleeck that stipulated the one and only qualification for eligibility
on the ACLU's governing bodies was the consistent support for the Bill of Rights. For
the first time ever, the Board intimated that it had established a different standard for its
members. 9
Rejection of the Van Kleeck motion proved a harbinger of what was to come. At
the Union's 5 February annual meeting, the National Committee tallied the results for the
qualifications provision. The following resolution passed by a vote of thirty to ten:

8
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While the American Civil Liberties Union does not make any test
of opinion on political or economic questions a condition of membership,
and makes no distinction in defending the right to hold and utter any
opinions, the personnel of its governing committees and staff is properly
subject to the test of consistency in the defense of civil liberties in all
aspects and all places.
That consistency is inevitably compromised by persons who
champion civil liberties in the United States and yet who justify or tolerate
the denial of civil liberties abroad. Such a dual position in these days,
when issues are far sharper and more profound, make it desirable that the
Civil Liberties Union make its position unmistakably clear.
The National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union
therefore hold it inappropriate for any person to serve on the governing
committees of the Union or on its staff, who is a member of any political
organization which supports totalitarian dictatorship in any country, or
who by his public declarations indicates his support of such a principle.
Within this category we include organizations in the United States
supporting the totalitarian governments of the Soviet Union and of the
Nazi and Fascist countries, such as the Communist Party, the GermanAmerican Bund and others, as well as native organizations with obvious
anti-democratic objectives and practices. 10

The National Committee's approval prompted the Board to convene a special
session. Even though the National Committee's decision had been termed "advisory,,
only, the unambiguous support for the resolution swung many of the undecided voters
into the pro-qualifications camp. Fourteen members--Richard Childs, Carl Carmer,
Morris Ernst, John Finerty, Walter Frank, Quincy Howe, Ben Huebsch, Thurgood
Marshall, William Nunn, Elmer Rice, Roger Riis, Norman Thomas, and Dorothy
Bromley--backed the resolution; six--Abraham Isserman, Osmond Fraenkel, Corliss

10
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Lamont, Lester Granger, William Spofford, and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn--opposed it. 11
The National Committee promptly re-adopted the resolution, whereby it was incorporated
into the Union's bylaws. 12

External Praise

The adoption of the 5 February Resolution capped an extraordinary tum of events.
The Board, however, downplayed its significance. Its press release attributed the need for
the Resolution to the Nonaggression Pact, which had signified communism's capitulation
to fascism. While admitting that the Resolution "appeared" to establish a test of personal
opinion, the statement insisted that the Resolution merely reiterated what heretofore had
been the ACLU's unspoken policy with regard to totalitarian ideologies. In this vein, the
Board maintained that no Communist or Fascist ever had been elected to the Board;
rather, all members who had joined the CPUSA had done so after their original
appointment. 13

"Several Board members could not attend this meeting to cast their vote. Instead,
they were permitted to register their votes at the following meeting on 19 February.
There, John Haynes Holmes, Harold Fey, Eliot Pratt, Roger Seymour, and Richard Wise
supported the resolution; Robert Dunn and Nathan Greene rejected; and two, Arthur
Garfield Hays and Mary Van Kleeck declined to vote. Therefore, the final tally was:
nineteen for, eight against, and two "present." See Minutes, 19 February 1940, ibid.
12Minutes,
13
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"Supplementary A.C.L.U. Statement to the Press of February 5, 1940," 5
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Adoption of the 5 February Resolution made national news and received
widespread comment. Generally, the response was overwhelmingly positive. The New
York Times penned: "There is an issue of freedom in this world and in the United States,
and the American Communists have chosen the side of slavery. Let them abide by their
decision. Liberty and communism don't mix." Lauded the Austin (TX) American:
"Nothing the American Civil Liberties Union has done in years has so commended it to
public favor." The Macon (GA) Telegraph put it succinctly: "The organization is to be
congratulated." Major newspapers like The Washington Post, the San Francisco
Chronicle, and the Wall Street Journal made similarly complimentary remarks. Thus, for
the first time in recent memory, the Union had garnered some favorable press. 14

Ward's Exit

If there were any doubts about whether or not the Resolution would be enforced,
they were dispelled with the election of a new Chairman. John Haynes Holmes won
unanimously, despite the lingering ill-will about his role in the troubles of the past year.
In Holmes's first address to the Board, he vowed: "The Resolution passed by our annual
meeting involve [sic] certain implications of action, which, it seems to me, must be

14
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fulfilled if those Resolutions [sic] are to be regarded as anything more than an idle
gesture." Then, in a comment that would take on greater meaning in the coming months,
Holmes promised "to perform the duties of this office with scrupulous impartiality, with
friendship as true for those with whom I may disagree as for those with whom I may
agree .... " 15
The outgoing Chairman became the Resolution's first casualty. Submitting a
lengthy letter ofresignation, Harry F. Ward attributed the adoption of the Resolution as
his reason for his departure. From the outset, he challenged the Board's assertion that the
Resolution merely rehashed an unspoken policy. Time and time again, wrote Ward, the
ACLU had renounced all interest in foreign civil liberties issues or tests of personal
opinion. Second, Ward contended that the Resolution, by implication, demanded that
members embrace anti-communism. Simply put, he said, the Resolution required
members "to conform to its views or get out," when in fact such orthodoxy was anathema
to a civil liberties organization. As a final point, Ward again challenged the notion that
the Resolution always had been the implicit policy of the organization. If indeed this
were so, he asserted, then why had three different Communists been re-elected to the
Board when their Party membership had been common knowledge? 16

15
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The Resolution's Ramifications

Ward's arguments against the Resolution were powerful ones and resonated
within many members and non-members; later, a bloc of six Board members and, then,
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn would borrow heavily from his letter. For those reasons, his
letter requires further elaboration. To begin with, despite what the Board claimed, the
Resolution did not square with the Union's previous policies. An abundance of recent
ACLU policy statements directly contradicted the Resolution. The April 1939 pamphlet
Why We Defend Free Speech for Nazis. Fascists and Communists had declared: "It [the
Union] takes no position on any political or economic issue or system." In addition, the
Board as recently as December 1939 had reaffirmed its commitment to members' freedom
of speech: "Members of the Union differ sharply in their political and economic views,
and all are free to express them without involving the Union." And just two weeks before
the Resolution's passage the Board had determined that "[i]t is the sense of the Board that
there is no occasion to adopt a resolution setting up standards of qualification for
membership .... " 17
Ward also contributed several thoughts to the ongoing debate over whether or not
the Resolution examined members' personal opinions. According to Ward, the
Resolution clearly did what it said it did not do. How else, he said, could the Board
determine if a candidate sympathized with totalitarian movements without first
17
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examining and then judging if his views were appropriately anti-totalitarian? If this did
not qualify as a "test of opinion," declared Ward, then by what other criteria could the
Board assess candidates? To this, the Board had no response.
Continuing, Ward pointed out that, since the Resolution disqualified persons for
either their writings or speech, it in fact penalized candidates even if the speech and
writings were unaccompanied by actions. Historically, Ward asserted, the ACLU always
had opposed the penalization of mere opinion. Abundant evidence buttressed Ward's
contention. For example, the Union's 1919 Annual Report maintained that "there is no
membership in the Union in the sense of committing those who join to any dogmatic
statement of principles." Ironically, twenty years later Roger Baldwin would paraphrase
this very position in a letter to Dr. Joseph Ayd, a professor of political science at
Columbia University: "We [the ACLU] do not throw people off because of political
beliefs." The 1939 publication of American Civil Liberties Inc., echoed Baldwin: "The
punishment of mere opinion without overt acts is never in the interest of orderly
progress." 18
But perhaps the Board's most outlandish claim, which Ward exposed, was that the
ACLU had never originally elected a Communist to its governing boards. Technically,
this was accurate: no Communist had ever served his inaugural term on the Board or
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National Committee having already been a member of the CPUSA. Yet this certainly did
not apply to re-elections: William Z. Foster joined the Party in 1921 and won reappointment to the National Committee three times thereafter; Communist Anna
Rochester was re-nominated to the Board in 1928; and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn won
unanimously in 1939, having revealed her Party membership two years beforehand. Such
embarrassing revelations did not faze the Board, however, which absurdly persisted in its
contention that re-elections were mere formalities and inaugural ones were the only true
elections.

Organizational Response to the Resolution

Ward did not stand alone in his protest. 19 Thirty-six other ACLU members
eventually resigned. In addition, by the Union's admission, five of the "most active" local
committees voiced their disapproval and, of fifty letters regarding the Resolution, twentyseven expressed opposition. 20
Even among the Board of Directors, the Resolution continued to generate protest.

19

The Union received many comments from non-members also. Fifty-five letters
were critical of the Resolution. The most notable one was signed by seventeen liberals,
including Robert Morss Lovett, Franz Boas, I. F. Stone, and Theodore Dreiser, who
urged the Board to reconsider. Crisis in the Civil Liberties Union, reel 93, ACLU
Records.
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Six Board members, all of whom voted against the Resolution, released a minority report
outlining their objections. Enumerating ten separate complaints, the minority, like Ward,
hammered at the Resolution's incompatibility with longstanding Union policy. 21
Although significant, the voices of opposition nevertheless stood in the minority.
And the majority, while exhilarated by the positive public response, understood that the
implementation of the 5 February Resolution required certain actions as well as words.
First, not a single member of the Board or the National Committee had vowed to uphold
the Resolution. Second, an admitted Communist still sat on the Board of Directors.
On the first issue, there was only so much that the Board could accomplish.
Elections within the Union occurred annually, at which point one-third of the offices
came up for consideration. Since the Resolution had been incorporated into the bylaws,
all members elected to the organization's governing bodies were subject to its provisions.
In short, to assume one's duties on the ACLU's Board or National Committee, the
candidate-elect had to approve of the Resolution in principle. Naturally, future elections
would require that candidates be polled on their support or opposition to the measure.
Yet 1940's annual elections had taken place on the day of, and immediately
following, the Resolution's adoption. Inevitably, the question arose: did the Resolution
apply to this most recent election, and, more generally, at what point in future elections
does a candidate vow to uphold the Resolution--before or after his election? To answer
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these questions, the Board turned to Arthur Garfield Hays, the ACLU's chief counsel, for
his determination. Hays concluded that, according to the organization's electoral by-laws,
it would be legally questionable to force candidate-elects to approve of the Resolution.
Therefore, he advised the Board in the future to poll candidates on the Resolution and
"elect only those who approve." As for the persons elected on 5 February, Hays
counseled the Board to nullify their elections, but also request that they serve on as
holdovers until the next election. 22
What to do about the Board's sole Communist seemed abundantly clear: Elizabeth
Gurley Flynn's continued presence was inconsistent with the Resolution and her
resignation was mandatory. Therefore, on 28 February, Board member Dorothy
Bromley, a columnist for Scripps-Howard newspapers, announced that she would request
Flynn's resignation at the following meeting. Bromley's announcement had come at the
behest of others, who felt that another woman should charge Flynn. Wrote Roger
Baldwin: "It's a tough job, but you [Bromley] are the person to do it with firmness and
delicacy. "23

Flynn Charged
At the 4 March Board meeting, Bromley did as she had promised, citing Flynn's
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continued service as inconsistent with the 5 February Resolution and requesting her
resignation. Flynn refused. Bromley, anticipating this response, promptly moved that the
Board hold a hearing for the purpose of expelling Flynn. The Board upheld Bromley's
motion and scheduled the hearing for 18 March. But because she would be out of town
on that date, Flynn asked that the Board reschedule for 25 March. 24
Flynn, realizing that she had little time for which to prepare her defense,
immediately began to wage her battle in the press. As she informed The New York
Times:

I have been a charter member of the union [sic] for twenty-three
years. I was re-elected to membership a year ago and my term of office
still has two years to run. It was known at that time that I was a member
of the Communist party [sic], yet I was elected unanimously.
Therefore I am contesting their right to charge me at this time on
the particular basis of my membership in the Communist party. I feel
compelled to fight for my right to membership on the Civil Liberties
Union. 25

Flynn then twned to the Communist press for help. She authored an article in the
19 March New Masses entitled, "Why I Won't Resign from the ACLU," which angrily
attacked the Board. Flynn set a defiant tone, even questioning the Board's right to judge
her: "I can say in all modesty that there are no two other members [herself and Ward]
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whose records surpass ours in the defense of the Bill of Rights." Again, she reminded
readers that she had informed the Board of her Party membership three years beforehand
and it had never been an issue until recently. She concluded the article by writing: "I
don't mind being expelled by this kind of people [the "pseudo-liberals" on the Board]. I
don't belong with them anyhow. I'll fight them to expose them, not from a desire to
associate with them any longer." 26
In addition, Flynn penned "I Am Expelled from Civil Liberties," which appeared
in the 17 March Daily Worker. While the title was somewhat premature, it did reveal that
Flynn harbored no illusion as to what the future held for her within the organization. In
this piece, her tone was even less measured, as she frequently resorted to sarcasm to make
her points. She aimed one particular broadside at Baldwin: "Mr. Baldwin, the Director,
used to boast of their [the Board's] broadness [in political, religious, and economic
composition]: 'Why we even have a Communist on our Board!' and timid old ladies
thrilled at his bravery. "27
Flynn's articles in the Daily Worker and the New Masses gave only more
ammunition to those who sought her ouster. John Haynes Holmes, who referred to the
articles as "perfectly outrageous," demanded her resignation:
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Assuming that you must have some sense of personal dignity and selfrespect, I regard it in your own mind as intolerable that you should any
longer have contact with us. . . . [Y]ou have certainly ... disqualified
yourself by these public and wicked attacks upon those whom you
formally called friends.

On the day after the publication of the Daily Worker piece, Roger Riis insisted that her
insults should be included among the charges against her. "Whatever is urged in
exculpation," Riis wrote, "no one will deny that these words of hers reveal an attitude
toward the Board and the Union which disqualify Miss Flynn as a member of the Board."
At the 1 April Board meeting, Riis formally filed his charge. Additionally, Elmer Rice
formally charged Flynn for the New Masses column at the 25 March Board meeting. 28

The Interim
The sudden illness of Flynn's son, Fred, postponed the date for her hearing beyond
the 25 March date. On 31 March 1940, Fred Flynn died during an operation for lung
cancer. The Board, however, did not allow her personal tragedy to affect the proceedings
against her. Rice's charge came after Flynn had notified the Board of her need for
indefinite leave. In addition, the Board drafted and issued public statements in defense of

28John

Haynes Holmes, Letter to Roger Baldwin, 19 March 1940, p. 89-90, vol.
2162, ACLU Collection; John Haynes Holmes, Letter to Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, 19
March 1940, p. 91-92, ibid.; Roger Riis, Letter to John Haynes Holmes, 17 March 1940,
p. 82-83, ibid.; Minutes, 1April1940, reel 8, ACLU Records; and Minutes, 25 March
1940, ibid.

96
their actions against her. Thus, by the time Flynn contacted the Board to arrange the
hearing for 8:00 in the evening of7 May at New York's City Club, the groundwork had
been laid solidly against her. 29

29News

Release (30 March 1940), ibid.; "Proposed Statement by the Board of
Directors," undated, p. 49-55, vol. 2162, ACLU Collection; and Minutes, 22 April 1940,
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Chapter Five:
The Trial of Elizabeth Gurley Flynn

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn
No sooner had Harry Ward resigned when proponents of the Resolution began
pushing for Elizabeth Gurley Flynn's removal. Her continued service on the Board
remained a highly visible--and embarrassing--contradiction with the adoption of the 5
February Resolution.
The task did not appear to be an easy one. Flynn was held in high esteem
throughout the organization, perhaps as well-respected as Ward himself. A charter
member of the ACLU, she had served on the National Committee from 1920 to 1936. In
1936 she had won a seat on the Board of Directors and was re-elected to another threeyear term in 1939. But Flynn, unlike Ward, showed no indication that she would leave
voluntarily.
Nor did it appear that Flynn would leave the Union quietly. She certainly was not
one to keep a low profile; in fact, she attracted attention wherever she went. Having
joined the International Workers of the World at the tender age of fifteen, Flynn gained
great renown for her inspired speaking ability. So gifted was she that The New Yorker
classed her with "Billy Sunday, William Jennings Bryan, and other brass-lunged giants of
Chautaqua days." Additionally, she was, by nearly all accounts, a woman of remarkable
97

98
beauty. Descriptions invariably focused on "her black hair, hanging down her back, and
her blue Irish eyes, ringed with black lashes." 1 Through the years, she had lost none of her
youthful magnetism.
Her attractiveness, however, did not detract from her underlying toughness. In the
labor movement, which was dominated by men, Flynn had proved over and over that she
was as devoted to the cause as they. She had been arrested and jailed on numerous
occasions for her striking activities. Moreover, she had played a leading role in strikes
such as the ones in Philadelphia (1911), Lawrence, Massachusetts (1912), Patterson, New
Jersey (1913), Passaic, New Jersey (1926). So respected was she that one male
counterpart admiringly described her:

[She was] a real friend to half the world, the mother of every bum, the
sister to every ham poet, a rebel, a fighter. She is the kind of woman I
wish all American feminists were. She has never sought or expected
privileges because of her sex--she has taken the gaff most men would have
shrunk from [sic]. 2

During World War I and thereafter, Flynn became more deeply involved with the
defense of civil liberties and particularly with the protection of labor's First Amendment
rights. She worked assiduously in the ACLU's defense of the anarchists Sacco and
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Vanzetti, World War I political prisoners, and Tom Mooney. 3
Yet the labor movement remained closest to her heart. After the International
Workers of the World folded, Flynn drifted towards the Communists, whose beliefs most
closely approximated her own. In 193 7, she joined the CPUS A, informing the Union's
Board of her decision. Thereafter, she rose rapidly through the Party's ranks to its highest
level, the National Committee, while also sitting on its Committee on Civil Rights. 4

7 May 1940, the New York City Club
At eight o'clock on the evening of 7 May, twenty-two members of the Board,
Roger Baldwin, and Lucille Milner convened to decide Flynn's fate. 5 Chairman John
Haynes Holmes presided.
The hearing started with procedural matters. The three charges were read.
Dorothy Bromley introduced the Resolution as evidence and then asked Flynn two brief
questions: Was Flynn a member of the CPUSA and did she sit on its National
Committee? Flynn replied in the affirmative to both. 6

3Flynn,
4
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Nine Board members declined to attend. Surprisingly, Norman Thomas and
Mary Van Kleeck were among the absentees. Van Kleeck boycotted the hearing in
protest of the proceedings; Thomas, for all his efforts in eradicating communism from
the Union, curiously did not show.
5

6
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Flynn then began her defense against Bromley's charge. Describing the
proceedings as "neither appropriate or fair," Flynn proudly re-declared her Communist
membership. Furthermore, she asserted that the Resolution contradicted the
organization's longstanding qualification that members pledge their allegiance to the Bill
of Rights. As evidence to this effect, Flynn cited Ward's letter of resignation, the
disapproval of five of the ACLU's "most active" local committees,7 the numerous
resignations of and protest letters from Union members, and the letter signed by the
seventeen prominent liberals. To buttress her contentions, she also cited several of the
Union's own publications.
Flynn also emphasized that her main concern involved the Bromley charge. The
Rice and Riis charges, she said, were irrelevant in any case: ifthe Board convicted her of
the first, then her expulsion would be a foregone conclusion. In any case, though, Flynn
challenged the Board's ability to act as an impartial judge and jury on any of the charges.
How could she possibly prevail, she queried, when all three of her accusers and a
Chairman who had referred to her as "a symbol of difficulties" sat in her judgment?
Additionally, she vigorously protested against the closed nature of the meeting, which she
likened to a "star chamber"; this atmosphere, she claimed, further stacked the deck
against her. 8
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Flynn's Fight
At this juncture Flynn's defense should be addressed. As stated in the ACLU's
bylaws, the Board retained the right to expel its members. This hearing, however, was
the first of its kind, and the procedure for expulsion had never been outlined specifically.
Hence, questions arose as to whether Flynn would be offered the right to counsel,
whether the ACLU Board could try her case, whether she could vote in her own trial, and
whether she could introduce evidence in her defense.
Some within the organization worried greatly that Flynn might challenge the
legality of the hearing if the outcome was unfavorable to her. These persons sought
guidance from the Union's chief counsel, Arthur Garfield Hays, on how to conduct the
hearing. Hays responded:

We should handle this matter in such a way as to be proof against
successful attack in court. Our determination cannot be challenged so long
as a hearing is granted and the proper vote taken, if the hearing is a fair
one and if there is any reasonable basis whatever as a foundation for the
actions taken. 9

Obviously, the persons in receipt ofHays's advice only listened to half of what
was suggested. True, the Board did offer Flynn the right to counsel during the
proceedings; Osmond Fraenkel served in this capacity for her. Moreover, the Board
agreed to Flynn's request that a record be kept of the hearing and permitted her to
9Arthur
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incorporate evidence into the transcript. Yet all similarities with a formal legal
proceeding ended there. In a court of law the defendant is guaranteed a trial by an
impartial jury. Nevertheless John Haynes Holmes overruled Flynn's objections to the
participation of her three accusers; at the same time, Flynn was denied an opportunity to
vote on her own behalf.
As for Flynn's contention that the Board was attempting to "railroad" her (the
"star chamber" accusation), this blame could not be pinned upon the Board. The Board
had determined the 8 May date of the hearing at the 22 April Board meeting. Therefore,
copies of the meeting's minutes would have been sent out on the 29 April. Granted,
allowing for the time of delivery, the news of the hearing's date would not have reached
ACLU members until a few days before the hearing on 7 May. Nevertheless New Yorkarea Union members still would have had knowledge of the trial before it took place.
Second, news of the impending hearing had been circulating since the latter half of
March, which would seem an adequate amount of time to organize protests--if there had
been support for such a measure. Last, Flynn knew full well that attendance was
restricted to Board members. She certainly had the time and opportunity to challenge the
hearing's prohibition to outside attendees; the fact that she did not was her own fault.

The Hearing Resumes
Having been interrupted by other members who wished to resolve procedural
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questions surrounding the hearing, Flynn continued with a sustained assault on the 5
February Resolution. As her first line of defense, she contended that the Resolution did
not square with previous Union policy and practices; in doing so, she referred to the
numerous examples that already have been enumerated. 10
Then, Flynn took an entirely different approach in her defense. As she had done
before, Flynn challenged the Board to provide evidence of her violation of the Bill of
Rights: "I defy [you] to prove any change in my position on civil liberties or my conduct
of them for the past three years." But instead of hammering away at this point, she
instead posited that communism was entirely compatible with the Bill of Rights. Flynn
produced a copy of the Soviet Constitution and flatly denied that the Soviet government
was totalitarian. In addition, she contrasted the egalitarianism of the Soviet Union with
the inequalities of capitalist societies. According to Flynn, the Soviet Union was less
oppressive to women, minorities, and the impoverished than the United States. 11

Consideration of the Second and Third Charges

Nearly four hours had passed before the Board turned to Rice's and Riis's charges.
So late had the hour become that Corliss Lamont noted that "it was difficult to think
clearly." Nevertheless, although Raymond Wise moved to adjourn the hearing, no one
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seconded the motion. 12
Forging ahead, Rice declared that Flynn's "attitude" expressed in the New Masses
article warranted her removal from the Board. Flynn countered that the "attitude" had
arisen over frustration with recent events: the inability of the minority to present their
interpretation of the Resolution, she said, had forced her to voice her protest through an
outside channel. More importantly, though, maintained Flynn, was that she had a First
Amendment right--like every other citizen of the United States--to express her opinion.
Never, she declared, would she move to curtail Rice's speech, even though she disagreed
as thoroughly with him as he with her. 13
Others appeared to take the article's comments very personally. Hays, Bromley,
and Finerty suggested as much. Corliss Lamont, however, asserted that intemperate
remarks hardly justified expulsion. Recalling Norman Thomas's 16 December 1939
article in The Call, Lamont reminded the Board that Thomas had referred to some as
"hypocrites ... [and] insincere," but had gone unpunished; in that situation, the Board had
issued only a mild admonishment, calling the article "highly improper." How, Lamont
asserted, was Flynn's article any different? 14
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Lamont received no answer, and the Board took up consideration of the third
charge. Flynn quickly presented her defense, reiterating what she had declared earlier:
"My basis [for writing the article] is my right to free speech and to defend myself." Yet
tempers had worn so thin that the debate persisted despite the conclusion of her
testimony. Members rehashed the Board's conflicts of recent years, unleashing
accusations and counter-accusations about whom ultimately was responsible for the
divisiveness. Yet Chairman Holmes, recognizing that the discussion had got sidetracked,
restored order by cutting off further discussion. He then requested that Flynn leave the
room, so that the Board could deliberate and vote on the charges freely. 15

Expulsion
On Dorothy Bromley's charge, the Board deadlocked. Bromley, Carl Carmer,
Morris Ernst, Benjamin Huebsch, William Nunn, Elmer Rice, Roger Riis, Whitney
Seymour, and Florina Lasker voted to sustain the charge; Robert Dunn, John Finerty,
Osmond Fraenkel, Nathan Greene, Arthur Garfield Hays, A. J. Isserman, Corliss Lamont,

principles. It disturbed him that Thomas had aired the Union's dirty linen in such a public
fashion and also that Thomas carelessly had labeled "six or seven" Board members as
Communist or fellow travelers. Fraenkel reprimanded Thomas: "So far as I know, there
is only one member of the Communist Party [Elizabeth Gurley Flynn] who is a member
of the Board, and whatever the degree of friendliness toward the CPUSA of other
members. . . . I think you should be the last to charge such persons as being
Communists." See Osmond Fraenkel, Letter to Norman Thomas, 17 December 1939, p.
57, vol. 2064, ACLU Collection.
15
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Beverly Kenyon, and William Spofford opposed it; and Alfred Bingham, and Walter
Frank abstained. 16
That left the outcome in the hands of one person. As the Union's bylaws clearly
stated, the Chairman reserved the right--but was under no obligation--to cast the deciding
ballot in the event of a tie. Holmes voted to sustain the charge, making the final tally ten
to nine. 17
Votes on the Rice and Riis charges lacked the drama of the first. Flynn lost on
both counts by identical tallies of twelve to eight. 18 As a result, the Board made one final
determination. By a vote of eleven to eight, the Board passed Rice's motion for
expulsion. Exhausted, the members adjourned at 2:20 in the moming. 19

Analysis
Several observations may be drawn from the hearing. First, the persons who had
brought the charges against Flynn played a major role in her expulsion. If Bromley, Rice,

16

Ibid., 157.

17

Ibid.

18

Walter Frank and Alfred Bingham participated in these decisions, both voting
against Flynn. Arthur Garfield Hays also voted to sustain both charges.
19

Minutes, 7 May 1940, reel 8, ACLU Records; Transcript of the hearing, p. 158,
vol. 2162, ACLU Collection; and "Liberties Union Drops Miss Flynn," The New York
Times, 9 May 1940, p. 25.
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and Riis had been disqualified from voting, the Bromley charge would have failed; 20 the
Rice and Riis tallies would have been much closer; and the final vote on expulsion would
have ended in a tie. Granted, Holmes undoubtedly would have sided with the proexpulsion contingent in the final balloting. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the accusers
skewed the results.
Second, Flynn may have committed a fatal error in her own defense. By
generalizing the issue of whether or not Communists were civil libertarians during
consideration of the Bromley charge--instead of focusing on whether or not she deserved
to retain her seat on the Board--she unnecessarily shifted attention away from herself and
clouded the debate. One of Flynn's strongest arguments had been that she had never
contravened the Bill of Rights; in fact, her opponents had never suggested or offered
proof that she had. Moreover, even if someone had accused her of a specific
transgression, Flynn had a built-in defense: in no instance since her joining the CPUSA
had she stood alone in the polemic disputes of the past few years; therefore, other
members were as guilty as she of any "violations" of civil liberties. Instead, Flynn
opened the door to a host of questions against which she could not possibly defend
herself. Arthur Garfield Hays, John Finerty, and Raymond Wise engaged her in a lengthy
discourse on whether or not Communists and Soviet citizens were as free to take
positions in opposition to the Party as she contended. Although Flynn maintained that
20

0f course, if Flynn herself had been allowed to vote, the outcome also would
have been in her favor.
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neither Communists nor Soviet citizens were subject to any rigid standard of discipline,
Hays and Wise indicated--by their line of questioning--that they did not agree. 21
Flynn's answers about the Soviet Union proved a pivotal moment in the hearing.
Later, John Haynes Holmes would write that Hays's interrogation "removed any lingering
doubt as to the necessity and right ... in removing a Communist from [the Union's]
membership." Roger Baldwin would recall: "Well, she testified at the trial that she
supported the Soviet Constitution. The Soviet Constitution was a one-party constitution.

It denied all other parties any right to campaign and to exist. She was very proud of her
support of the Soviet Constitution. "22
Third, in its haste to end the hearing, the Board never recalled Flynn to inform her
of the outcome. Although she had waited for nearly two hours, Flynn learned of her
expulsion only through an informal gathering of hungry Board members that followed.
Outraged by this treatment, she penned a letter of protest to the Board. As she
communicated, she fully had expected to be recalled before any of voting took place, so
that she may have voted in her own behalf. Furthermore, she considered the Board's
failure to deliver their verdict as discourteous, at best, and, at worst, a violation of due
process. Flynn objected: "Even the meanest criminal in a court oflaw is allowed to
receive the verdict of their jury face to face. Yet I, as a charter member of the [Union],

21

22
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John Haynes Holmes, Letter to A. F. Whitney, 26 August 1940, p. 212-16, ibid.;
and Donohue, Politics, 151.
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was denied this right by you. 1123

Public and Internal Comments

Flynn's removal did not become official with the actions of7 May. The Board
still required the approval of the National Committee before the expulsion became
official. Yet for all intensive purposes, Flynn no longer sat on the Board.
Comment on Flynn's expulsion generally commended the Board for its decision.
The New York Times echoed the sentiments of the pro-ouster forces: "Communism is no
real present menace here, but that is no reason for putting Communists on guard over the
citadel of individual rights. They just don't believe in such rights." The New Yark
Herald-Tribune put it bluntly: "She [Flynn] has about as much right to represent the cause
of civil liberties as Stalin himself." Nevertheless, one important periodical--outside of the
Communist press--took up Flynn's defense. The Nation protested:

... [S]he has not . : . been even charged with behavior violating the basic
principles of the Union. Since no overt act was involved it should have
been possible to delay or avoid the issue rather than precipitate it at a time
when popular feeling against extreme elements is running as high as it is
today. 24
23

Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Letter to Board of Directors, 8 May 1940, p. 164, vol.
2162, ACLU Collection.
24
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Regardless of the largely positive public commentary, however, the
disappointment and anger of Flynn's defenders lingered. Mary Van Kleeck resigned from
the Board and quit the organization. Corliss Lamont wrote Chairman Holmes "that you
may have permitted impatience, suspicion, and a passionate anti-Communist feeling to
lead you into making unfounded charges." National Committee member A. F. Whitney
objected: "Simple justice and fair play would again suggest that Miss Flynn was punished
not because of what she said or did, but because she belonged to a certain group."
Moreover, six Board members issued a lengthy pamphlet protesting Flynn's ouster. 25
No matter how loudly the minority complained, however, the majority refused to
revisit the matter. The Union's other members, by all indications, appeared to back
Flynn's removal. First, an informal poll conducted by the Board revealed that the
organization's rank-and-file overwhelmingly supported the 5 February Resolution: out of
921 returns, 755 approved of the decree. Second, the National Committee solidly upheld
Flynn's expulsion. Twenty-seven Committee members sustained the determination,
twelve opposed, two abstained, and ten did not respond to repeated appeals for their

25
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votes. 26

The Disputed Election

Unable to repeal the Resolution or overturn the expulsion, the minority was left
with only one other option. During the 5 February annual meeting, eight Board members
were re-elected. Just prior to this balloting, the National Committee had approved 5
February Resolution, which stipulated that adherence to totalitarian doctrines was
incompatible with service on the ACLU's governing bodies. Thus, according to the
Resolution, candidates to the Board were required to pledge their support for the
principles enumerated in that document before the election could occur.
The problem bedeviling the Board was that none of the eight Board members
elected on 5 February had taken the oath to uphold the Resolution. Since the Resolution
mandated that the pledge be taken beforehand, the Union's chief counsel, Arthur Garfield
Hays, advised the Board to nullify the election and then re-elect only those who took the
oath. Abraham Isserman, however, bitterly contested this maneuver. He maintained that
the Resolution contradicted the organization's bylaws, which did not specifically permit
"provisos or conditions of any kind" to be attached as a prerequisite for election.
Therefore, since the Resolution directly conflicted with the bylaws, Isserman asserted that

26
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the Resolution was unconstitutional and the results of the election stood. 27
For a period of several months, no headway was made in resolving the
disagreement. The motives of each side were apparent. Those in favor of voiding the
election did not wish to repeat the expulsion of other members and hoped that the preelection oath would weed out those who sympathized with totalitarian political theories.
The persons in favor of preserving the election results sought to have the Resolution
declared unconstitutional, or, at the very least, to render it useless by ensuring that it
could not be invoked. As it was, a majority of the Board concurred with Hays's decision.
Yet Isserman threatened to initiate legal action if the Board nullified the election. 28
To avoid a protracted court battle, Hays and Isserman eventually consented to
submit the dispute to outside arbitration. Selecting Professor Karl Llewellyn, both
promised to abide by whatever decision Llewellyn reached. Professor Llewellyn
concluded that the election was legal and that the results stood. Unfortunately for the
pro-Flynn elements, however, this small victory did not result in the Resolution's repeal.29

Flynn's Exit

27
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On 12 August 1940 the Board officially informed Flynn of the results of the
National Committee's poll. Accompanying this notification, the Board "expressed its
appreciation of Miss Flynn's long service to the cause of civil liberties. "30
In very un-Flynn like fashion, she departed rather quietly. She did author a single
article castigating the Board for its capitulation to anti-communism. Beyond that,
however, she rarely mentioned the American Civil Liberties Union again. She remained
active in the CPUSA and other radical organizations until her death in 1964, which
occurred during a visit to the Soviet Union. In recognition of her significant
contributions to the Party, her Soviet hosts sprinkled a portion of her ashes beneath the
Kremlin Wall, one of the highest honors ever bestowed upon an American Communist. 31

30
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Conclusion:
Partisanship in the American Civil Liberties Union

Assessing whether or not the ACLU Board handled Flynn's expulsion in an
impartial manner requires the consideration of two different questions: in light of the
prevailing political climate of that time, (1) was it reasonable? and (2) was it fair?

Reasonable?
As this analysis has suggested, Flynn's removal represented the culmination of
over two decades of battles with opponents who characterized the Union as aligned with
the Communist movement. The Overman Committee, the Lusk Committee, R. M.
Whitney, the United Mine Workers' Senate report, and the Fish Committee laid the
groundwork for such accusations. Nevertheless, the Union weathered these storms in
relatively good shape.
HUAC, however, posed a different challenge. Heightened public fears of Fascist
and Communist activities in the United States engendered wide popular support for the
Committee's investigation. Moreover, HUAC's investigative abuses often were not as
apparent to the public at large as they were to the ACLU, or they were rationalized as an
unfortunate consequence of its extraordinary mission. As a result, the Committee's
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attacks on the Union succeeded in dramatically tarnishing the organization's image.
Meanwhile, an ongoing debate within the ACLU's Board of Directors had come to
a flashpoint. Squabbles over Gastonia, the Madison Square Garden riot, and Henry Ford
increasingly had polarized the Board. Disgruntled members intimated that their
colleagues were less concerned with the defense of civil liberties than with the pursuit of
their personal agendas. Then, the accumulated frustrations of battling HUAC exposed the
formation of two--albeit ill-defined--camps.
The signing of the Nazi-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, however, proved to be the
watershed in the Board's interpersonal relations. Suddenly, the distinctions between
Stalinist Russia and Nazi Germany became blurred, not only to the public at large, but to
many on the Board. The Pact resulted in two developments: (1) some Board members,
while not sanctioning HUAC's violations of civil liberties, now believed that the
investigation of Fascist and Communist activities had some merit; and (2) a heated debate
broke out about the presence of Communists and Communist sympathizers on the
ACLU's governing bodies.
Outright hostility among Board members crystallized over the publication of the
Wise report. Designed as position paper against HUAC's reauthorization, the report's
original draft outraged some members with several favorable remarks about its
archenemy. Revisions in the report only incensed its earlier supporters. Yet it was the 5
February Resolution that split the Board irrevocably; furthermore, it represented the final
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word on an ongoing dispute about communism, civil liberties, and divided loyalties.
Each side made compelling arguments. The anti-Communists rightly noted
communism's atrocities and repression. How, they asked, can a person sanction the
brutalization of citizens abroad while defending the rights of persons within this country?
The anti- anti-Communists, in turn, reminded their counterparts that the Bill of Rights
applied only to the citizens of the United States. Moreover, they countered, was not a
conviction for anti-civil libertarian attitudes--without specific incriminating evidence-tantamount to guilt by association?
In the final analysis, the immediate results of the 5 February Resolution were very
positive for the anti-Communist Board members: Ward resigned, the national press
applauded the forthright stand against Communist participation, and the opposition to the
Resolution was dealt a major defeat. Over the long-term, however, the ramifications
were less clear. Several important members--Ward, Flynn, and Mary Van Kleeck--would
never return to the organization. Yet now, in a less hostile climate, the Board could
concentrate on the defense of civil liberties.
Thus, in returning to the original question, was the expulsion "reasonable"? Yes,
it was. The anti-Communist members of the Board genuinely believed that the group had
lost its focus and become consumed with its internal disputes, which threatened the entire
organization's continuation. To steer the Board back to its true course, the antiCommunists felt that a thorough housecleaning was essential.
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Fair?

Determining fairness often is fraught with subjectivity. Certainly when Roger
Baldwin and Morris Ernst (and whoever else was involved) bypassed the Board and
sought the National Committee's approval of the Resolution, such a maneuver clearly
violated any standard of fairness. Likewise, the anti-Communists' announcement that
they would secure Ward's resignation from the Board revealed their prejudgment of an
esteemed member and a valuable contributor to the organization.
Of course, neither of these issues deals directly with Flynn's expulsion. They do,
however, establish a pattern of bias against the Board's "leftists." Therefore, while the
expulsion proceedings were given an air of impartiality by providing a forum with which
Flynn might combat the charges, all signs indicated that her fate had been predetermined.
Dorothy Bromley's charge represented the first time ever that a Board member formally
had been threatened with expulsion. Yet Bromley did not present a single example of
Flynn's contravention of civil liberties. The evidence against her rested solely upon her
membership in the Communist Party.
The implication of this charge escaped most of the Board's members. By
promoting the concept that Communist membership was tantamount to attitudes or
actions that were at variance with the concepts of the Bill of Rights--without specific
proof to support the claim--the ACLU engaged in one of the very practices for which it
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had condemned HUAC so vehemently: guilt by association. 1 To be sure, the CPUSA
received its marching orders from the Soviet Union, and the Stalinists had committed
wholesale violations of their own citizens' civil liberties. Moreover, the CPUSA
unquestionably took a purely self-interested approach to the Bill of Rights: on countless
occasions, the Party had insisted on and fought for the full range of constitutional
protections for itself and its allies, while denying that its foes deserved the same
freedoms. On the other hand, American Communists had contributed to the broadening
of civil liberties in several areas, particularly labor's rights. Therefore, to generalize that
Communist doctrine was incompatible with the Bill of Rights, in the absence of a
scintilla of evidence to buttress that claim, should have been challenged aggressively.
But was it incumbent upon the Board to present "evidence" of Flynn's
contravention of civil liberties, or was it enough that a majority was convinced of her
"guilt"? On one hand, the ACLU certainly would have contested a legal charge against
one of its clients without specific proof of wrongdoing. Yet Flynn was not accused of
criminal wrongdoing, and the Board certainly reserved the right to determine who sat on
the organization's governing bodies. Furthermore, Flynn's re-election in 1939 did not
obligate the Board to fulfill the remainder of her term; if it ascertained "wrongdoing" of a
member, the Board should have been able to expel her. Thus, there should be no doubt

1
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that it was fair for the Board to hold a hearing on Flynn's continued service.
Nevertheless, while the Board was required to comply only with its own
organizational guidelines, one should not forget that the Board had never given formal
consideration to the expulsion of a member before. The Union's bylaws offered little
guidance in the matter. To clarify how the hearing should be conducted, therefore, Arthur
Garfield Hays counseled Roger Baldwin that the Board should proceed as if the outcome
would be challenged in a court oflaw. ;'Our determination cannot be challenged so long
as a hearing is granted and the proper vote taken, if the hearing is a fair one and if there is
any reasonable basis whatever as a foundation for the actions taken," advised Hays. 2
The Board largely ignored Hays's stipulations. Although a hearing was granted
and "reasonable" justification had been established for its necessity, a "proper" vote was
not taken, nor was the procedure "fair." First, the objectivity of Flynn's accusers was
clearly suspect; Bromley, Ernst, and Rice should not have been permitted to sit in her
judgment. But at the very least, since all three were allowed to vote, Flynn should have
been allowed to cast her ballot as well. Second, an impartial "judge"--ifthat term may be
analogized to Holmes's role in the hearing--normally would have recused himself when
he had been involved so intimately with the efforts to oust Flynn. As early as 19 March,
Holmes had betrayed his true sentiments to Flynn about her service on the Board:
"Neither on your side nor on ours [the Board] can there be continued relations ....

2
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Obviously this is a case for divorce." 3 Not surprisingly, Holmes cast the deciding vote on
the Bromley charge. Third, it seems unlikely that an unbiased judge and jury would have
upheld two counts of "inappropriateness" against a person for exercising her
constitutional right to free speech and free press. Norman Thomas had penned a similar
diatribe against members of the Board; why was he not disciplined? Last, and most
importantly, it remains extremely doubtful that the Board satisfied Hays's criterion of
having established a "reasonable basis" for expulsion. If Flynn's Communist membership
indeed compromised her defense of civil liberties, then surely some evidence must have
existed to bolster that contention. Yet none was presented.

MeaCulpa
To the Union's credit, the organization eventually acknowledged that it had made
a mistake in expelling Flynn. In 1967, three years after Flynn's death, the ACLU
rescinded the 5 February Resolution and amended its bylaws by expressly prohibiting the
removal of Communists from its governing bodies without credible evidence of
violations of civil liberties. Another nine years passed before the organization
specifically admitted that it had wronged Flynn. On 10-11April1976 the Board of
Directors, by a vote of thirty-two to eighteen, formally apologized:

... [T]here was no evidence that ... Ms. Flynn had ever committed any
3
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act which in any way violated or transgressed any of the basic principles
for which the ACLU has stood .... [T]he expulsion was not consonant
with the basic principles on which the ACLU was founded ....
Therefore, it is the sense of this Board that Ms. Flynn should not have
been expelled . . . .4

In Perspective

Lucille Milner, the Union's longtime secretary, devoted an entire chapter of her
autobiography to the Flynn hearing. Milner reflected: "One need not be prompted by any
concern for the Communist Party or for Elizabeth Flynn to be disturbed about the basic
principle involved in what we had just witnessed. It was nothing other than a political
inquiry by the Civil Liberties Union." Corliss Lamont, in his autobiography, recalled the
lessons of 1940:

Nineteen-forty was one of the most important years in my life. I
had joined the Board ... in 1932 when I was thrity years old, to uphold the
ideals of American democracy . . . . But when the crisis regarding
Comunists and Communism occurred, a majority of those individuals
whom I had so admired compromised their civil liberties principles and
utilized unscrupulous tactics to put across their purge program. It proved
the greatest disillusionment to me and at the same time taught me that I
had to be continually on my guard in the debased world of politics against
the hypocrisy of some so-called liberals.

In addition, Roger Baldwin's biographer, Peggy Lamson, commented at length on Flynn's
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expulsion: "... [I]t often struck me as I talked to various people about Roger, notably
Corliss Lamont, Alan Reitman, Lucille Milner, and Osmond Fraenkel, that all roads
seemed to lead to Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. "5
Whether or not Flynn's ouster warrants the comments made by Lamont, Milner,
and Lamson is debatable. There are legitimate questions as to how the Board would have
been able to provide effective leadership to the organization if it had not taken the action
it did. Yet Flynn's removal should not be minimized for several reasons. First, the events
leading up to her expulsion illustrate--in a microcosm--the divisiveness caused by the
issue of communism among civil libertarians. Second, the ACLU did not observe a
neutral position on an important domestic and international issue, contradicting what it
always has claimed to have done. To be sure, the Board's individual members held strong
personal feelings about communism. Those beliefs did not remain personal, however; the
anti-Communists maneuvered so that the organization adopted a position against the
presence of Communists on its governing bodies, and, then, orchestrated Flynn's removal.
Third, and most importantly, the Union's Board of Directors compromised the civil
liberties of one of its most senior and respected members in the name of anticommunism. Naturally, one must wonder, ifthe group was willing to sacrifice one of its
own, then what sort of defense would the ACLU provide to Communists outside of the
organization? That question remains impossible to answer. Yet the most prestigious
5
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civil liberties organization in the United States would confront a resurgence in antiCommunist hysteria during the late 1940s and early 1950s. Having made its position
perfectly clear about Communists in its own organization in 1940, the American Civil
Liberties Union would enter into the second Red Scare struggling to convince the courts,
other organizations, and the public at large that Communists, or suspected Communists,
required the same constitutional protections as anyone else.
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